When originally published in 1985 this volume was the first scholarly and objective contribution available on Rhodesian counter-insurgency. It documents and explains why Rhodesia lost the war. The origins of the conflict are reviewed; each chapter examines a separate institution or counter-insurgency strategy directly related to the development of the conflict, concluding with a summary view of the Rhodesian security situation both past and present.
Table of Contents
1. A Brief History of the War for Zimbabwe: 1890 to 1979 2. Command and Control 3. Protected and Consolidated Villages 4. Border Minefield Obstacles 5. Pseudo Operations and the Selous Scouts 6. Internal Defence and Development: Psychological Operations, Population and Resource Control, Civic Action 7. External Operations 8. Operation Favour: Security Force Auxiliaries 9. Intelligence 10. The Security Situation by Late 1979 11. Conclusion