1st Edition

Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice Economic Approaches in Political Science

By Patrick Dunleavy Copyright 1991
    300 Pages
    by Routledge

    300 Pages
    by Routledge

    First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.

    1. Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis
    2. Interest Groups and Collective Action
    3. Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
    4. Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
    5. Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
    6. Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
    7. The Bureau-Shaping Model
    8. Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
    9. Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science


    Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)