Democratic Planning and Social Choice Dilemmas : Prelude to Institutional Planning Theory book cover
1st Edition

Democratic Planning and Social Choice Dilemmas
Prelude to Institutional Planning Theory

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ISBN 9780754619529
Published November 28, 2002 by Routledge
340 Pages

USD $160.00

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Book Description

Using the economic approach of social choice theory, this unique book examines difficulties found in democratic processes involved in the creation and implementation of planning policies. Social choice theory focuses on the hard trade-offs to be made between rationality in decision-making on the one hand, and political values such as democracy, liberalism and freedom from manipulation on the other. As an institution can be seen as a set of rules, the focus on rules and procedures of collective choice makes social choice theory well suited for analysing important political aspects of planning institutions. Special attention is given to communicative planning and the logical reasons why all the desirable properties of dialogue cannot be simultaneously attained. The analysis provides original and significant new insights into the process and the institutions involved. It highlights weak spots of present planning techniques and procedures and suggests further steps towards institutionally enriched planning theory.

Table of Contents

Contents: Introduction: The social choice approach to institutional planning theory. Democracy, Rationality, and Planning: Applying Arrow’s Theorem: Paradox of dialogical decision-making: Evaluation and arguments: balancing the procedural values of priority setting techniques; Institutions of communicative-calculative synthesis: structured group processes; Decision cycles in two transport planning cases. Public Interest and Protected Spheres: Applying Sen’s Theorem: Democratic planning and the liberal paradox; Loyalty dilemmas in advocacy planning; Privacy as a planning problem: transport-related examples; Equality and planning with protected spheres. Manipulation in Planning: Applying Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s Theorem: Power concentration or manipulation in the planning process; Planning style and agency properties; Agency profiles applied to positive planning theory; Economics of dialogue: hard trade-offs in communicative planning; Epilogue: Challenge and response; Bibliography; Glossary of social choice terms; Index.

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Tore Sager, Professor, Department of Transport Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway.