This is a groundbreaking analysis of China's territorial disputes, exploring the successes and failures of negotiations that have taken place between its three neighbours, namely India, Japan and Russia. By using Roberts Putnam's two level game framework, Chung relates the outcome of these disputes to the actions of domestic nationalist groups who have exploited these territorial issues to further their own objectives. By using first-class empirical data and applying it to existing theoretical concepts, this book provides a detailed account of China's land and maritime border disputes that is both clear and accessible.
List of Maps, Figures and Graph Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. The Two-Level Game Hypothesis 3. The Diaoyu / Tiaoyutai / Senkaku Islands Dispute 4. The Zhenbao / Chenpao / Damansky Islands Dispute 5. The McMahon Line / Aksai Chin Dispute 6. Beyond Two-Level Games? The Role of Subnational, National and Transnational Actors in the South China Sea Islands Dispute 7. Testing the Propositions of the Two-Level Game Hypothesis 8. Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index