1st Edition
Economic Growth, Inequality and Crony Capitalism The Case of Brazil
List of figures
List of tables
Preface
1 Cronyism, growth and inequality
Ricardo’s predicament and the argument in short
Contribution: understanding Ricardo’s predicament
Roadmap: a central puzzle and its explanation
Capitalism, regulation, Left and Right: a brief reflection
2 Crony capitalism actors, continuity and change
Crony capitalism in Brazil
Business
Politicians
Bureaucrats
Formalizing the argument
Change
3 Industry leaders and political engagement
Are industry leaders more politically engaged?
Testing the hypothesis in Brazil
Estimation
Conclusion
4 The politics of taxation in Brazil
Disjoint layering and the tax system
Subnational taxation and tax breaks
Tariff policies
Conclusion
5 Pharmaceuticals
Functions and distortions of bureaucracies
The pharmaceutical industry in Brazil
The cases of São Paulo and Goiás
Anvisa: welcomed but unloved
Why not fight back against regulatory distortion?
6 Agriculture
Blurred lines
The agricultural boom in Brazil
Demand for Pareto optimal reforms
The bootstrap sector?
The political clout of agribusiness
7 Conclusion
Future research
Bibliography
Index
Biography
Danilo Rocha Limoeiro holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT and a Master’s degree with distinction from Oxford University. Currently, he is the co-founder of Turivius, a company dedicated to helping developing countries decrease bureaucracy through technology.
"That Brazil is notoriously one of the hardest countries in the world to do business is often decried but largely unexplained. Combining a sophisticated theoretical approach with careful case studies of tax policies and the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, this innovative work shines a spotlight on the political equilibrium that sustains high transaction costs: politicians enjoy leverage over economic actors, who do not collectively resist because well-connected businesses benefit from a regulatory regime that raises the barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs. This book should be of broad interest to students of the political economy of emerging market economies." — Frances Hagopian, Harvard University
"Observers in Brazil have long lamented both the excessive regulation by the public sector and the overweening power of big business in the private sector. This deeply researched book finally puts them together, under sustained scrutiny, to show how they are mutually reinforcing. Far from being a fervent advocate of free markets, big business in fact benefits from, and politically supports, the detailed rules and regulations that give big business a leg up and keep potential competitors out. Scholars of market reform and business power, in Brazil and elsewhere, will want to read this innovative and troubling book." — Ben Ross Schneider, MIT






