Economic models are used to show the extent of the difficulties involved in monitoring and enforcing pollution control laws on a continual basis. The authors make several recommendations for policy change. They also show that high rates of compliance can be achieved within tight budget constraints. Originally published in 1986

    Chapter 1 Introduction to the Problem; Chapter 2 Current Efforts to Induce Continuous Compliance; Chapter 3 Excursions into Law and Technology; Chapter 4 Economic Models of Monitoring and Enforcement; Chapter 5 Statistical Background; Chapter 6 A Statistical Quality Control Model; Chapter 7 Lessons from Game Theory Approaches; Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations;


    Russell, Clifford S. ; Harrington, Winston; Vaughn, William J.

    'The authors attempt to bring to earth much of the environmental literature that implicitly assumes pollutant dischargers will comply with environmental laws regardless of their self-interest and that violators are discovered and punished-reality holds otherwise.' Energy Review