Undoubtedly, emotions sometimes thwart our epistemic endeavours. But do they also contribute to epistemic success? The thesis that emotions 'skew the epistemic landscape', as Peter Goldie puts it in this volume, has long been discussed in epistemology. Recently, however, philosophers have called for a systematic reassessment of the epistemic relevance of emotions. The resulting debate at the interface between epistemology, theory of emotions and cognitive science examines emotions in a wide range of functions. These include motivating inquiry, establishing relevance, as well as providing access to facts, beliefs and non-propositional aspects of knowledge. This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. All essays are specifically written for this collection by leading researchers in this relatively new and developing field, bringing together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and scepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and cognitive science, Cartesian epistemology and virtue epistemology.
Dr Georg Brun, Senior Research Fellow, Environmental Philosophy Group, Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH ZÃ¼rich, Switzerland; Dr Ulvi Doguoglu, Senior Research Associate, University of ZÃ¼rich, Switzerland and Dr Dominique Kuenzle, Research Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of ZÃ¼rich, Switzerland.
’I recommend this collection. ...it provides an excellent snapshot of current research in, what will continue to be, a hot topic in epistemology.’ Metapsychology Online Reviews ’Epistemology and Emotions is a valuable collection of papers, a seminal work in what we can expect to become a productive new area of research. Brun, Doguoglu, and Kuenzle have done the discipline of philosophy a needed service in producing the first collection of its kind -- one we can hope will be the first of many.’ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews ’Though a slim volume of just nine essays, Epistemology and Emotions is worth purchasing for its introduction alone, a near perfect summary of the theoretical activity behind the resurgence of interest in the function of emotions in epistemology. In a few pages, we are treated to lucid précis of the main positions, a fascinating account of the debates regarding the variety of emotions and the differences between affective states (such as emotions and moods), theories of emotion, and the various arguments against emotion’s epistemological significance. The fact that at least five of the essays are excellent presentations of the major positions makes this book a must-have for any philosopher interested in emotion, epistemology, or both.’ Philosophy in Review ’Research into the cognitive role of the emotions [...] is now progressing well and is, perhaps, the best evidence that many analytic philosophers think this kind of psychologism no longer an error but a necessity. This volume is a significant addition to this line of work, presenting as it does an interesting combination of original pieces that review, criticise, and build upon what has been done. Among the authors are some of the most significant researchers in the field, including Ronald de Sousa, whose The Rationality of Emotion (De Sousa 1987) was an early and influential contribution. Any multi-author collection of papers faces the potential difficulty that organisin