This book explores the causes of monetary instability in reforming economies and evaluates alternative institutional mechanisms designed to reduce inflationary pressures. It views inflation as a political issue and make a case for the creation of strong political institutions.
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Political Economy of Establishing Monetary Stability Part One: Aspects of the Political Economy of Inflation 1. The High Costs of Monetary Instability 2. Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Importance of Budget Controls for Monetary Stability 3. Inflation and Optimal Seigniorage in the CIS and Eastern Europe 4. The Politics of Inflation: An Empirical Assessment of the Emerging Market Economies Part Two: Institutional Mechanisms for Promoting Economic Stability 5. Guidelines for Constructing Monetary Constitutions 6. Designing Central Bank Arrangements to Promote Monetary Stability 7. Central Banking in Economies in Transition 8. Alternative Approaches to Monetary Reform in the Formerly Communist Countries: A Parallel Strategy Part Three: Case Studies 9. The Russian Central Bank and the Conduct of Monetary Policy 10. Impediments to the Macroeconomic Stabilization of Russia 11. The Collapse of the Ruble Zone, 1991-93 12. The Latvian Monetary Reform 13. Fiscal and Monetary Policies in the Transition: Searching for the Credit Crunch