Evidentialism is a popular theory of epistemic justification, yet, as early proponents of the theory Earl Conee and Richard Feldman admit, there are many elements that must be developed before Evidentialism can provide a full account of epistemic justification, or well-founded belief. It is the aim of this book to provide the details that are lacking; here McCain moves past Evidentialism as a mere schema by putting forward and defending a full-fledged theory of epistemic justification. In this book McCain offers novel approaches to several elements of well-founded belief. Key among these are an original account of what it takes to have information as evidence, an account of epistemic support in terms of explanation, and a causal account of the basing relation (the relation that one's belief must bear to her evidence in order to be justified) that is far superior to previous accounts. The result is a fully developed Evidentialist account of well-founded belief.
"For reasons that perplex me, Conee-Feldman style evidentialism is routinely misunderstood by critics. McCain’s excellent book therefore performs a great service to epistemologists: it provides not only the most complete Conee-Feldman style evidentialist theory available but also ample motivations for evidentialism in light of a great range of examples and challenges from the literature, all under one cover." – Todd R. Long, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
1. Evidentialism 2. Evidence 3. Possessing Evidence 4. Evidential Fit 5. Basing a Belief on the Evidence 6. Explanationist Evidentialism 7. More Evidence to Gather