The book presents a collective action perspective to explain how extraterritoriality functions and assess when, and to what extent, extraterritoriality is effective. A collective action perspective provides a new account of foreign anti-bribery laws and their extraterritorial enforcement that draws on theories discussed in the field of economic governance. Within this framework, the book offers an intensive analysis of US foreign anti-bribery law such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), international law as it emanates from the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and comparative insights into UK law and German law. To test the theory in practice, the book provides a unique data set of more than 40 foreign anti-bribery enforcement actions conducted by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other examples from comparative jurisdictions.
Extraterritoriality and International Bribery is ideal reading for academics and students with an interest in global governance, economic crime, criminology, and law and economics, as well as practitioners concerned with foreign anti-bribery enforcement, including compliance officers, lawyers, investigating and prosecuting authorities, and business leaders. The book also discusses governance alternatives existing outside international anti-bribery law and offers policy and legal reforms proposals. The book suggests a decentralized enforcement model with the delegation of some enforcement tasks to an external body as the most appropriate governance alternative.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. International Bribery and Collective Action Problems 3. The Evolution of Foreign Anti-Bribery Legislation 4. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and National Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws 5. Foreign Anti-Bribery Enforcement Schemes 6. Patterns of foreign anti-bribery enforcement 7. The Effectiveness of Extraterritorial Anti-Bribery Enforcement 8. How should the OECD anti-bribery enforcement regime foster collective action? 9. Beyond the OECD: international court and other alternatives 10. Conclusion Table of Cases and Settlements International Agreements Statutes Recommendations, Guidelines, and Reports of Public Authorities and International Organizations
Branislav Hock, Ph.D., is a Lecturer in Counter Fraud Studies at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth. He has research expertise in the area of transnational economic crime such as corruption and bribery along with interests in corporate compliance and economic governance. Dr Hock is a member of the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), where he worked as a researcher and completed PhD in anti-corruption law. He worked in the Private Office of the Dutch Member of the European Court of Auditors and for a law firm advising on various compliance issues. Dr Hock is a co-founder of the European Compliance Center.
"Hock’s book provides an intellectually rich theory of extraterritoriality that helps to explain the formation of multilateral anti-corruption regimes." -Yuliya Zabyelina, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY