This book is a survey and critique of the major theories of financial crises. The first edition built a model of crisis from an analysis of postwar financial crises in the US through the mid-1980s. The second edition continues the story from 1985 and covers the stock market crash of 1987, the collapse of the Savings and Loan industry, the severe problems of US commercial banks, and the increasing risks posed by junk bonds. A new chapter analyses the causes of increasing financial instability in the 1980s. The book's extensive charts and tables are fully revised and updated to present the latest evidence. The first edition has gained wide interest as a supplemental text.
Table of Contents
List of Tables, List of Figures, Preface to the Second Edition, 1. Introduction, PART I. THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND FINANCIAL CRISES, 2. Cyclical Theories of Financial Crises, 3. Comparison of Cyclical Theories, PART II. FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE POSTWAR U.S. ECONOMY, 4. The Credit Crunch of 1966, 5. 1970: Penn Central, 6. 1974: Franklin National, 7. The Silver Crisis of 1980, 8. The 1982 Crisis, 9. The Legacy of 1982, 10. The Collapse of Speculative Lending and Investment, PART III. UNDERSTANDING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE, 11. A Business-Cycle Model of Financial Crises, 12. Evaluating the Business-Cycle Model, 13. Noncyclical Theories ofFinancial Crises, 14. The Changing Financial System, Notes, Selected Bibliography, Index, About the Author,
Martin H. Wolfson teaches economics at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana. He was formerly an economist at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C. He received the B.A. degree from Swarthmore Col-lege, and did graduate study in economics at Harvard University and The Ameri-can University, where he earned his Ph.D. He is engaged in ongoing research on developments in the financial system.