Futile Diplomacy, Volume 1
Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913-1931
Most students of the history of Arab-Jewish relations have come to take for granted the stubborn resistance of the continuing dispute to any form of lasting and ‘reasonable’ solution. This book, first published in 1983, examines early Arab-Zionist negotiating experience with the assumption that this has direct relevance to our understanding of the possible outcomes of diplomatic approaches to resolving the conflict. Its main purpose is to assemble (half of the book consists of original souce documents) and discuss some of the raw material which may help readers focus more clearly on the origins of the conflict, and perhaps to eliminate some recurring fallacies about its development and the prospects for its resolution. An examination of the period 1913 to 1931 reveals of wealth of previous negotiating experience which is today largely forgotten, and indicates that there was little or no movement of any of the parties in the direction of modifying its basic minimum demands and aspirations.
Table of Contents
1. First Attempts 1.1. Nature and Development of Arab-Zionist Relations in Palestine, 1882-1914 1.2. Growing Awareness of a Conflict 1.3. The Turkish Factor 1.4. First Negotiation Attempts, 1913 1.5. Renewed Contacts, 1914 1.6. Failure of the 1914 Conference 2. Post-War Diplomacy, 1918-1920 2.1. Aftermath of World War 1 2.2. Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente 2.3. First Local Contacts: Cairo and Palestine 2.4. The British Factor 2.5. Weizmann-Faisal Negotiations 2.6. The Undoing of the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement 3. High-Level Meetings in the Early Twenties 3.1. Another Palestinian-Zionist Encounter 3.2. Early Relations with Amir Abdallah 3.3. Syrian Nationalists 3.4. Collapse of the Cairo Talks 4. Grass-Roots Contacts During the Twenties 4.1. Local Zionist Proposals for an Agreement 4.2. Arab Initiatives for an Agreement 4.3. Arab and Jewish Motives for Cooperation 5. Relations in the Wake of Crisis, 1929-31 5.1. Negotiating Opportunities and the Wailing Wall Dispute 5.2. Uncertainties of British Policy 5.3. Third Party Intervention: H. St-John Philby 5.4. Zionist Rejection of the Philby Mediation 5.5. Split in Zionist Ranks 5.6. Daniel Oliver: Quaker Mediator 5.7. Preventative Diplomacy: the Joint Bureau 5.8. Kalvaryski’s Personal Diplomacy 5.9. Rutenberg Proposals 5.10. Weizmann’s Personal Diplomacy 5.11. Development Scheme Negotiations 5.12. Conclusion. Conclusion. Lessons of Experience. Palestinian and Non-Palestinian Arabs. Third-Party Considerations. Terms of Agreement. Low Priority of an Arab-Zionist Accord Documents