Global Economic Institutions
In recent years, there has been a very steep increase in globalization which, among other things, has provoked an increased interest in global economic institutions. Such interest comes notably from the emerging countries. However, researchers who wish to understand better the workings and impact of these institutions are confronted with several problems. First, many of the present features of these international organizations are rooted in their history, but access to older contributions to the literature that shed light on the reasons behind the adoption of such structures is often very difficult. Second, the relevant modern contributions appear in a bewildering array of journals, books, and reports that range over different fields such as economics, law, and political science.
The sheer scale of the growth in research output on global economic institutions - and the breadth of the field - makes this collection especially timely and welcome. It presents researchers and other users with a rationally structured set of the key contributions that together give a balanced picture of the field. Covering both canonical and cutting-edge scholarship, it also includes work that was intended to inspire policy. Among such normative studies, the best of those that have actually marked major developments and opened up new eras in international cooperation and academic thinking are included.
The materials selected and introduced by the collection’s editor, a leading scholar in the field, are organized along lines of specialization. The first volume explores general aspects that are common to all global economic institutions, while the other three each deal with a specific field. Volume two covers trade, volume three, finance and volume four, environment. Each volume presents a similar structure featuring first, the rationale of international institutions; second, the principles that inspire and orient their functioning; third, the way they are organized and structured; and fourth, their governance and instruments.
Global Economics Institutions is an essential reference collection and is destined to be valued as a vital research resource by all scholars and students of the subject.
Table of Contents
1. R. O. Keohane (1982), ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, International Organization, 36, 2, 325–55.
2. M. Fratianni and J. Pattison (1982), ‘The Economics of International Organization’, Kyklos, 35, 244–66.
3. A. A. Stein (1982), ‘Coordination and Collaboration, Regimes in an Anarchic World’, International Organization, 36, 2, 299–324.
4. J. Tinbergen (1977), Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome (New York: New American Library), 11–24.
5. H. G. Grubel (1977), ‘The Case Against the New International Economic Order’, Weltwitschaftliches Archiv, 2, 284–307.
6. C. F. Amrasinghe (1996), Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1–23.
3. Organizations and Structures
7. B. S. Frey (1984), ‘How Do International Organisations Function?’, International Political Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 143–64.
8. N. Woods and A. Narlikar (2001), ‘Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank’, International Social Science Journal, 53, 170, 569–83.
9. R. Vaubel (2006), ‘Principal Agent Problems in International Organizations’, Review of International Organizations, 1, 125–38.
10. A. M. Slaughter (2000), ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’, in M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ, Press), 177–205.
11. K. Raustiala (2000), ‘Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation. Part 2: Compliance, Implementation and Effectiveness’, Case Western Journal of International Law, 32, 387–98.
12. B. Simmons (1998), ‘Compliance with International Agreements’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 75–93.
13. K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal (2001), ‘International Standards and International Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 3, 345–70.
14. J. Merills (2003), ‘The Means of Dispute Settlement’, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), pp. 529–57.
15. R. O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, and A. M. Slaughter (2000), ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational’, International Organization, 54, 3, 457–88.
16. W. Molle (2003), ‘Evaluation and Outlook’, Global Economic Institutions (London: Routledge), 261–83.
Volume II: Trade
6. Rationale (Problems, Solutions)
17. W. Molle (2003), ‘From Protection to Free Trade in Goods and Services’, Global Economic Institutions (London: Routledge), 135–43.
18. R. Prebisch et al. (1950), The Economic Development of Latin America, and its Principal Problems (New York: UN, ECLA), 1–18.
19. J. Frankel and D. Romer (1999), ‘Does Trade Cause Growth?’, American Economic Review, 89, 3, 379–99.
20. H. Yanikkaya (2003), ‘Trade Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Investigation’, Journal of Development Economics, 72, 57–89.
21. S. H. Bailey (1932), ‘The Political Aspect of Discrimination in International Economic Relations’, Economica, 35, 89–115.
22. H. Horn and P. Mavroidis (2001), ‘Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favored Nation Clause’, European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 233–79.
23. P. McCalman (2002), ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause’, Journal of International Economics, 57, 151–76.
24. B. Hindley (1987), ‘Different and More Favourable Treatment—and Graduation’, in J. M. Finger and A. Olechowski (eds.), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Washington DC: The World Bank), 67–74.
25. K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger (2001), ‘Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System’, European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 281–325.
8. Organization, Operations, Structure
26. A. Dixit, A. (1998), ‘Transaction Cost Politics and Economic Policy: A Framework and a Case Study’, in M. Baldassarri, L. Paganetto, and E. S. Phelps (eds.), Institutions and Economic Organizations in Advanced Economies: The Governance Perspective (Basingstoke, Macmillan), 139–75.
27. J. M. Finger (1991), ‘The GATT as an International Discipline Over Trade Restrictions: A Public Choice Approach’, in R. Vaubel and T. D. Willett (eds.), The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press), 125–41.
28. G. Orcalli (2003), ‘A Constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/WTO’, Constitutional Political Economy, 14, 141–54.
29. J. McMillan (1989), ‘A Game Theoretic View of International Trade Negotiations: Implications for Developing Countries’, in J. Whalley (ed.), Developing Countries and the Global Trading System, Vol. 1 (Basingstoke: Macmillan), 26–44.
30. J. N. Bhagwati (1976), ‘Market Disruption, Export Market Disruption, Compensation and GATT Reform’, World Development, 4, 12, 989–1020.
31. M. L. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2000), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlements in GATT/WTO Disputes’, Fordham International Law Journal, 24, 158–72.
32. M. Buetler and H. Hauser (2000), ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16, 2, 503–33.
33. S. Picciotto (2005), ‘The WTO Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 18, 3, 477–503.
34. A. K. Rose (2004), ‘Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?’, American Economic Review, 94, 1, 98–114.
Volume III: Finance
11. Rationale, Problems, Solutions
35. Ch. Wyplosz (1999), ‘International Financial Instability’, in I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods (Geneva: UNDP), 152–89.
36. K. Rogoff (1999), ‘International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13, 4, 21–42.
37. M. Aglietta (1995), ‘The International Monetary System’, in R. Boyer and Y. Saillard (eds.), Regulation Theory: The State of the Art (London: Routledge), 64–71.
38. D. Vines and C. L. Gilbert (2004), ‘The IMF and International Financial Architecture: Solvency and Liquidity’, in D. Vines and C. L. Gilbert (eds.), The IMF and its Critics: Reform of the Global Financial Architecture (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 8–35.
39. P. Mosley (1992), ‘A Theory of Conditionality’, in idem (ed.), Development Finance and Policy Reform (London: St Martins Press), pp. 129–53.
40. P. Collier et al. (1997), ‘Redesigning Conditionality’, World Development, 25, 9, 1399–407.
41. A. Dreher (2004), ‘A Public Choice Perspective on IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality’, Public Choice, 119, 445–64.
13. Organizations; Operations; Structure
42. S. C. Thacker (1999), ‘The High Politics of IMF Lending’, World Politics, 52, 1, 38–75.
43. R. Vaubel (1991), ‘The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund: A Public Choice Analysis’, in R. Vaubel and T. Willett (eds.), The Political Economy of International Organisations: A Public Choice Approach (Boulder: Westview Press), 204–44.
44. J. E. Stiglitz (2003), ‘Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and Accountability’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 16, 1, 111–39.
45. B. A. Simmons (2000), ‘International Law and State Behaviour: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs’, American Political Science Review, 94, 4, 819–35.
46. J. R. Vreeland (2006), ‘IMF Program Compliance: Aggregate Index Versus Policy Specific Strategies’, Review of International Organisations, 1, 359–78.
47. D. E. Ho (2002), ‘Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?’, Journal of International Economic Law, 5, 647–88.
48. G. Bird (1996), ‘The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and Policy Options’, International Organization, 50, 3, 477–512.
49. A. Y. Evrensel (2002), ‘Effectiveness of IMF Supported Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries’, Journal of Money and Finance, 21, 565–87.
Volume IV: Environment
16. Rationale, Problems, Solutions
50. G. Hardin (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162, 1243–8.
51. D. Meadows (1972), ‘The Limits to Growth: A Global Challenge’, Report to the Club of Rome Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books), 122–8.
52. S. Barrett (1990), ‘The Problem of Global Environmental Protection’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6, 1, 68–79.
53. O. R. Young (1989), ‘The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment’, International Organization, 43, 3, 349–76.
54. UNCED (1992), Agenda 21, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment (‘Rio Declaration’).
55. OECD (1975), ‘The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition, Analysis and Implementation’ (Paris: OECD), 15–17.
56. H. Bugge (1996), ‘The Principle of "Polluter Pays" in Economics and Law’, in E. Eide and R. van den Bergh (eds.), Law and Economics of the Environment (Oslo: Juridiks Forlag), 53–90.
57. K. R. Foster, P. Vecchia, and M. H. Repacholi (2000), Risk Management: Science and the Precautionary Principle, Science, 288, 979–81.
58. J. Cameron (1994), ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law’, in T. O’Riordan and J. Cameron (eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (London: Earthscan), 262–91.
59. Y. Matsui (2002), ‘Some Aspects of the Principle of "Common But Differentiated Responsibilities" International Environmental Agreements’, Politics, Law and Economics, 2, 151–71.
60. L. Rajamani (2000), ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments Under the Climate Regime’, RECIEL, 9, 2, 120–31.
18. Organizations; Operations, Structure
61. E. Hey (2007), ‘International Institutions’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnee, and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 750–69.
62. C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (1998), ‘International Environmental Agreements: Incentives and Political Economy’, European Economic Review, 42, 561–72.
63. E. Petrakis and A. Xepapadeas (1996), ‘Environmental Consciousness and Moral Hazard in International Agreements to Protect the Environment’, Journal of Public Economics, 60, 95–110.
64. R. Congleton (2001), ‘Governing the Global Environmental Commons: The Political Economy of International Environmental Treaties and Institutions’, in G. Schulze and H. W. Ursprung (eds.), International Environmental Economics: A Survey of the Issues (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 241–63.
65. B. Cashore (2002), ‘Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State-Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 15, 4, 503–29.
66. R. B. Mitchell (1996), ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’, in J. Cameron et al. (eds.), Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (London: Earthscan), 3–28.
67. K. Raustiala and D. G. Victor (1998), ‘Conclusions’, in D. G. Victor, K. Raustiala, and E. B. Skolnikoff (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 676–89.
68. S. Barrett (1994), ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements’, Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878–94.
69. M. Faure and J. Lefevere (1999), ‘Compliance with International Environmental Agreements’, in N. J. Vig and R. S. Axelrod (eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (Washington: CQ Press), 138–56.
70. R. Boyd and M. E. Ibarraran (2002), ‘Cost of Compliance With the Kyoto Protocol: A Developing Country Perspective’, Energy Economics, 24, 21–39.
71. O. R. Young and M. Levy (with G. Osherenko) (1999), ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes’, in O. R. Young (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 1–32.