Part 1: Hume's Practicality Argument Introduction 1. A Contradiction, not an Ambiguity 2. Validity and the 'Moderate' Version 3. Metaphysics and the 'Extreme' Version 4. Sentimentalists, Secondary Qualities and Sensations 5. The Inconsolable Sceptic Part 2: The Practicality Argument Today 6. Morality’s Dynamism 7. Desires, Beliefs and 'Direction of Fit' 8. A Riddle and a Buried Assumption 9. The Case of Owen Wingrave Final Remarks
Biography
Sophie Botros is an Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London. She previously taught at the Universities of Essex and Stirling and at King's College, London, and has written on ethics, ancient philosophy, and philosophy of action in leading philosophical journals.
'The previous objection not withstanding, this is an extremely important book. Botros brings to light an ambiguity in Hume's text that is crucially important, with which anyone attempting to interpret or use Hume's arguments will need to contend. She impressively and convincingly argues that there is a glaring blind spot among Humean scholars and meta-ethicists with respect to the parts of Hume's text that contradict the standard or 'moderate' reading of the argument.' – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
'In this excellent book, Botros aims to show, first, that it is not at all clear what exactly the argument is supposed to be, and second, that whatever it is, it is unsuccessful ... A significant contribution.' – The Times Literary Supplement
