Countries throughout Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are moving from semi-closed to open economies and from authoritarian to democratic political systems. Despite important differences between the regions, these transitions involve similar tasks: the establishment of governmental institutions and electoral systems conducive to legitimation of the new and fragile democracies and expansion of the institutional infrastructure of a market economy.This volume looks at both regions, focusing on the relationship between the tasks of institutional design and the outcomes of the process of economic and political liberalization. In particular, the contributors emphasize the design of institutions to serve a market economy, the design of electoral laws, and the design of executive-legislative relations. Each chapter discusses the legacy of the pre-existing authoritarian regime; the range of preferences among various strategic actors (the government, state bureaucracies, opposition parties, and interest groups) with regard to the pace and mix of reforms; and the consequences of final choices for the institutionalization of effective economies and the process of democratization.
Table of Contents
Institutional Design and Democratization; (Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman. ); The Design Of Electoral Systems; Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America; (Barbara Geddes. ); Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America; (Dieter Nohlen. ); Proportional Representation Versus Majoritarian Systems: Free Elections and Political Parties in Poland, 19891991; (Stanislaw Gebethner. ); Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile; (Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela. ); The Design Of Executive-Legislative Relations; Executive-Legislative Relations in Crisis: Polands Experience, 19891993; (Jerzy J. Wiatr. ); Parliamentarism in the Making: Crisis and Political Transformation in Hungary; (Gyrgy Szoboszlai. ); Changing the Balance of Power in a Hegemonic Party System: The Case of Mexico; (Juan Molinar Horcasitas. ); Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Argentina; (Carlos Santiago Nino. ); The Design Of Market Economies; Privatization in Central Europe: Can It Be Designed?; (va Voszka. ); Obstacles to Economic Reform in Brazil; (Juarez Brando Lopes. ); The Multiple Roles of Privatization in Argentina; (Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo Rozenwurcel. ); The Design of Democracies and Markets: Generalizing Across Regions; (A. Lijphart and C. H. Waisman.)
Arend Lijphart is professor of political science at University of California at San Diego, where Carlos H. Waisman is professor of sociology. Arend Lijphart is professor of political science at University of California at San Diego, where Carlos H. Waisman is professor of sociology.