1st Edition

Kant and Non-Conceptual Content

Edited By Dietmar Heidemann Copyright 2013
232 Pages
by Routledge

242 Pages
by Routledge

232 Pages
by Routledge

Conceptualism is the view that cognizers can have mental representations of the world only if they possess the adequate concepts by means of which they can specify what they represent. By contrast, non-conceptualism is the view that mental representations of the world do not necessarily presuppose concepts by means of which the content of these representations can be specified, thus cognizers can... Read more

1. Introduction: Kant and Non-conceptual Content: The Origin of the Problem Dietmar H. Heidemann

2. Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content Robert Hanna

3. Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction Robert Hanna

4. A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism Brady Bowman

5. Hanna, Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and Benacerraf’s Dilemma Terry F. Godlove, Jr.

6. Is there a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction? Stefanie Grüne

7. Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness Tobias Schlicht

8. Was Kant a nonceptualist? Hannah Ginsborg

Biography

Dietmar H. Heidemann is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Luxembourg. His area of specialisation is Kant, German Idealism, theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind.