Introduction 1. Hume’s Theory of Mental Representation 2. Two Objections to Hume’s Theory of Mental Representation 3. The A-Deduction and the Nature of Intuitions 4. The Object of Representation 5. Self and World in the Analogies of Experience 6. The Inferential Self Postscript of Transcendental Idealism
Biography
David Landy is Associate Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University, USA
"The author offers interesting and illuminating analyses of this or that portion of Kant's project, and he often explains difficult material lucidly. The work is imaginative, and Landy is not afraid to take positions that are unpopular." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"For a reader who likes Sellars and Kant and good, jargon-free Kant-exegesis combining philosophical plausibility and exegetical novelty, this book is highly recommended." --Thomas Vinci in Kantian Review
