1808 Pages
    by Routledge

    Law and politics are deeply intertwined. Law is an essential tool of government action, an instrument with which government tries to influence society. Law is also the means by which government itself is structured, regulated, and controlled. It is no surprise, then, that law is an important prize in the political struggle and that law shapes how politics is conducted.

    As serious thinking about and around law and politics continues to flourish and develop, this new title in Routledge’s Critical Concepts in Political Science series meets the need for an authoritative reference work to map and make sense of the subject’s vast literature, and the ongoing explosion in research output. Edited by a leading scholar in the field, Law and Politics is a four-volume collection of foundational and cutting-edge contributions.

    The materials gathered in the first volume cover jurisprudence and constitutionalism. The assembled major works examine crucial questions such as: what is law? And: what purposes do constitutions serve? Volume II, meanwhile, focuses on how courts operate and how judges make their decisions, examining the judicial process from trial courts to appellate courts. The third volume addresses the relationship between law and society and assesses the intersection between the legal process and social actors, considering such issues as how ordinary people think about the law and how legal compliance works. The final volume in the collection considers law, courts, and politics from an international and comparative perspective, bringing together the best and most influential research on such topics as the foundations of judicial independence and the relationship between law and economic development.

    With a full index, together with a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Law and Politics is an essential work of reference. The collection will be particularly useful as an essential database allowing scattered and often fugitive material to be easily located. It will also be welcomed as a crucial tool permitting rapid access to less familiar—and sometimes overlooked—texts. For political scientists and lawyers, as well as those working in cognate disciplines, it is sure to be valued as a vital one-stop research and pedagogic resource.


    Volume I

    1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, Harvard Law Review, 1897, 10, 8, 457–78.

    2. H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review, 1958, 71, 4, 593–600, 606–24.

    3. Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review, 1958, 71, 4, 630–5, 638–48, 661–72.

    4. Joseph Raz, ‘Authority and Justification’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1985, 14, 1, 3–29.

    5. Ronald M. Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, Critical Inquiry, 1982, 9, 1, 179–200.

    6. Charles Howard McIlwain, ‘Some Modern Definitions of Constitutionalism’, and ‘Modern Constitutionalism and Its Problems’, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Cornell University Press, 1947), pp. 1–22, 139–46.

    7. Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘The Constitution as an Institution’, Columbia Law Review, 1934, 34, 1, 1–31, 37–40.

    8. Keith E. Whittington, ‘Constitutionalism’, in Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 281–99.

    9. Clinton Rossiter, ‘Constitutional Dictatorship’ and ‘Constitutional Dictatorship: The Forms, the Dangers, the Criteria, the Future’, Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 3–8, 288–314.

    10. James Bradley Thayer, ‘The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law’, Harvard Law Review, 1893, 7, 3, 129–56.

    11. John Hart Ely, ‘Policing the Process of Representation: The Court as Referee’, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 75–87, 88–104.

    12. Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’, Yale Law Journal, 2006, 115, 6, 1348–59, 1369–401, 1406.

    13. Sanford Levinson, ‘"The Constitution" in American Civil Religion’, The Supreme Court Review, 1979, 123–52

    Volume II

    14. Robert A. Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker’, Journal of Public Law, 1957, 6, 2, 279–95.

    15. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, ‘Introduction: Supreme Court Policy Making’, ‘Models of Decision Making: The Attitudinal and Rational Choice Models’, and ‘The Decision on the Merits: The Attitudinal and Rational Choice Models’, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1–12, 86–97, 312–26.

    16. Richard A. Posner, ‘What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’, Supreme Court Economic Review, 1993, 3, 1–42.

    17. Walter F. Murphy, ‘Marshalling the Court’, Elements of Judicial Strategy (University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 37–78.

    18. Ethan Bruce De Mesquita and Matthew C. Stephenson, ‘Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication’, American Political Science Review, 2002, 96, 4, 755–66.

    19. Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald R. Songer, ‘Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions’, American Political Science Review, 2000, 94, 1, 101–16.

    20. Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, ‘Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court’, American Political Science Review, 1988, 82, 4, 1109–27.

    21. Mark A. Graber, ‘The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary’, Studies in American Political Development, 1993, 7, 1, 35–53, 61–73.

    22. Howard Gillman, ‘How Political Parties Can Use Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891’, American Political Science Review, 2002, 96, 3, 511–24.

    23. Georg Vanberg, ‘Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review’, American Journal of Political Science, 2001, 45, 2, 346–61.

    24. Tom S. Clark, ‘The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy’, American Journal of Political Science, 2009, 53, 4, 971–89.

    25. John A. Ferejohn and Charles R. Shipan, ‘Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990, 6, 1, 1–20.

    26. Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover, ‘A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations’, American Journal of Political Science, 1992, 36, 1, 96–121.

    27. Charles H. Franklin and Liane C. Kosaki, ‘Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion’, American Political Science Review, 1989, 83, 3, 751–71.

    28. Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson, ‘The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences’, Journal of Politics, 2004, 66, 4, 1018–35.

    29. Gregory A. Huber and Sanford Gordon, ‘Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?’ American Journal of Political Science, 2004, 48, 2, 247–63.

    Volume III

    30. E. P. Thompson, ‘The Rule of Law’, Whigs and Hunters (Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 258–69.

    31. William J. Novak, ‘Public Economy: The Well-Ordered Market’, The People’s Welfare (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 83–95.

    32. Robert A. Kagan, ‘Adversarial Legalism and American Government’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1991, 10, 3, 369–79, 392–406.

    33. Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, 3, 1, 1–44.

    34. Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, ‘Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative’, Law and Social Inquiry, 1995, 29, 2, 197–226.

    35. Lauren Beth Edelman, ‘Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law’, American Journal of Sociology, 1992, 97, 6, 1531–5, 1542–69.

    36. William L. F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, ‘The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming’, Law and Society Review, 1980–1, 15, 3/4, 631–54.

    38. Gerald N. Rosenberg, ‘Bound for Glory? Brown and the Civil Rights Revolution’, The Hollow Hope (University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 42–57.

    39. Paul Frymer, ‘Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85’, American Political Science Review, 2003, 97, 3, 483–99.

    40. Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley, and Paul H. Robinson, ‘Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2002, 83, 2, 284–99.

    41. David Garland, ‘The Culture of High Crime Societies’, British Journal of Criminology, 2000, 40, 3, 347, 354–75.

    42. Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’, Law and Society Review, 2003, 37, 3, 513–39.

    43. William Haltom and Michael W. McCann, ‘Full Tort Press: Media Coverage of Civil Litigation’, Distorting the Law (University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 147–74.

    Volume IV

    44. Martin Shapiro, ‘The Prototype of Courts’, Courts (University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 1–35.

    45. J. Mark Ramseyer, ‘The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach’, Journal of Legal Studies, 1994, 23, 2, 721–47.

    46. Matias Iaryczower, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi, ‘Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935–1998’, American Journal of Political Science, 2002, 46, 4, 699–716.

    47. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Calderia, and Vanessa A. Baird, ‘On the Legitimacy of National High Courts’, American Political Science Review, 1998, 92, 2, 343–58.

    48. Ran Hirschl, ‘Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales’, Texas Law Review, 2004, 82, 7, 1819–33, 1854–60.

    49. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitments: The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, 1989, 49, 4, 803–32.

    50. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Schleifer, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’, Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 112, 2, 445–70.

    51. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 2001, 91, 5, 1369–80, 1383–401.

    52. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, ‘Criticism of Presidentialism and Responses’, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 28–54.

    53. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, ‘An Epidemiological Analysis of Constitutional Mortality’, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 122–46.

    54. Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’, Indiana Law Journal, 1999, 74, 3, 819–26, 833–9, 841–6, 855–8, 866–71, 885–92.

    55. Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’, International Organization, 2000, 54, 2, 217–44, 249–52.

    56. Beth A. Simmons, ‘International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs’, American Political Science Review, 2000, 94, 4, 819–35.

    57. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International Organization, 2000, 54, 3, 421–50, 454–6.