This book addresses an aspect of the theory and practice of foreign policy that has assumed increasing emphasis in the study of international relations. It provides a comprehensive analytical assessment of the role of learning in the development of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Part I: Perspectives on Learning 1. Introduction 2. Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept 3. Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations 4. Why Competitive Politics Inhibits Learning in Soviet Foreign Policy Part II: Case Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy 5. The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Arms Control 6. Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe 7. The Strategic Basis of Learning in U.S. Policy Toward China, 1949-1988 8. Learning in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Middle East 9. The Lessons of Korea and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 10. Learning in U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Nixon-Kissinger Structure of Peace 11. Learning in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s Part III: Case Studies of Soviet Foreign Policy 12. Learning in the Nuclear Age: Soviet Strategic Arms Control Policy, 1969-1989 13. Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe Since World War II 14. Soviet Policy Toward China, 1969-1988 15. Learning in Soviet Policy Toward the Arab-Israel Conflict 16. Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev Meet the "Reagan Doctrine” 17. Attempted Learning: Soviet Policy Toward the United States in the Brezhnev Era 18. Soviet Learning in the 1980s Part IV: Conclusions 19. Learning and the Evolution of Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities 20. Interactive Learning in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control 21. What Have We Learned About Learning?