This book examines the lessons of the U.S.-Soviet experiment with detente in the 1970s, with particular attention to the effort to develop a basis for cooperating in crisis prevention. It provides a reconceptualization of the problem of moderating U.S.-Soviet rivalry.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Detente: The Search for a "Constructive" Relationship 3. Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy 4. Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative Competition? 5. The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972: Origins and Expectations 6. The Kremlin and Detente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations 7. The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: Origins and Impact 8. The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention 9. Missed Opportunities for Crisis Prevention: The War of Attrition and Angola 10. The Ogaden War: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention 11. Negotiated Limitations on Arms Transfers: First Steps Toward Crisis Prevention? 12. Crisis Prevention in Cuba 13. Why Detente Failed: An Interpretation 14. The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts 15. Crisis Prevention Reexamined