1st Edition

Marx and Wittgenstein Social Praxis and Social Explanation

By D. Rubinstein Copyright 1981
    242 Pages
    by Routledge

    244 Pages
    by Routledge

    Despite the great differences between them, both Marx and Wittgenstein reject Cartesian dualism by showing that the mind is a property of action and that hte meaning of an action lies not in subjective consciousness but in the system of social praxis in which an action occurs. This common view provides groundwork for undercutting the enduring debate between 'subjectivism' and 'objectivism' in the social sciences, and is the key to their notionof social explanation. Because the meaning of an action, in their view, is a feature of social order rather than individual consciousness, the form of analysis implied in their work cannot be termed either subjectivist or objectivist. Rather it incorporates the useful aspects of both forms of analysis since understanding action, in this view, presupposes an understanding of the system of social practices in which it occurs. It is argued at several points that both subjectivism and objectivism are largely efforts to resolve the problems posed for social science by dualism, and that the key to the ability of Marx and WIttgenstein to transcend the debate is in their shared rejection of Cartesian dualism.

    The unique objectives of the study will be of particular interest to all philosophers and social scientists, and all those interested in the interrelationship between the two disciplines.

    Introduction; Part 1; Chapter 1 The problem of a social science; Chapter 2 Objectivism in social science; Chapter 3 Subjectivism in social science; Chapter 4; Conclusion to Part I; Part 2 II; Chapter 5 Mind and body; Chapter 6 Mind and action; Chapter 7 Philosophical analysis and understanding ideas; Chapter 8 Explaining action; Chapter 9 The social self; Chapter 10 The epistemology of Marx and Wittgenstein; Chapter 11; Conclusion;


    D. Rubinstein Department of Sociology University of lllinois, Chicago Circle