1st Edition
Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence
Preface Executive Summary I. Introduction: Minimum Deterrence II. Minimum Deterrence and U.S. Policy III. Minimum Deterrence: Assumptions, Logic and Conclusions IV. Examining and Testing the Fundamental Assumptions and Logic of Minimum Deterrence V. Summary and Conclusion: How Does Minimum Deterrence Fare Against Available Evidence and What Alternative Guidelines May Be Better? Notes Appendix
Biography
Keith B. Payne, Study Director; President, National Institute for Public Policy; Department Head, graduate school of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Washington, DC campus)
The Honorable James Schlesinger, Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Energy; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
"Schlesinger and Payne critically evaluate eight key assumptions underlying the strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence. They conclude that the diplomatic benefits of reducing the United States’ weapons store to the lowest level ‘required’ are outweighed by the risk of attack if the perceived threat of US nuclear retaliation is reduced." - Lanxin Xiang, (2014)
