Although scientific models and simulations differ in numerous ways, they are similar in so far as they are posing essentially philosophical problems about the nature of representation. This collection is designed to bring together some of the best work on the nature of representation being done by both established senior philosophers of science and younger researchers. Most of the pieces, while appealing to existing traditions of scientific representation, explore new types of questions, such as: how understanding can be developed within computational science; how the format of representations matters for their use, be it for the purpose of research or education; how the concepts of emergence and supervenience can be further analyzed by taking into account computational science; or how the emphasis upon tractability--a particularly important issue in computational science--sheds new light on the philosophical analysis of scientific reasoning.
Introduction I. Models 1. The Productive Tension: Mechanisms vs. Templates in Modeling the Phenomena Tarja Knuuttila and Andrea Loettgers 2. Theories or Models? The Case of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory Tracy Lupher 3. Modeling and Experimenting Isabelle Peschard 4. Model Dynamics: Epistemological Perspectives on Science and Its Education Michael Stoeltzner II. Simulations 5. Weak Emergence and Computer Simulation Mark Bedau 6. Agent-Based Modeling and the Fallacies of Individualism Brian Epstein 7. Scientific Models, Simulation, and the Experimenter's Regress Axel Gelfert 8. Simulation and the Sense of Understanding Jaakko Kuorikoski 9. Models and Simulations in Brain Experiments Patrick Suppes III. Representation 10. Representing with Physical Models Ronald Giere 11. The Truth of False Idealizations in Modeling Uskali Maki 12. The Truth of False Idealizations in Modeling Uskali Maki 13. Formats of Representation in Scientific Theorizing Marion Vorms
"It is common to find in reviews of fictional works such claims as, ‘I could not put this book down’. There are very few books in philosophy of science about which I would make that claim; this is one for which it is an apt description." – R. Paul Thompson, University of Toronto, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews