1st Edition

Moral Disagreement

By Rach Cosker-Rowland Copyright 2021
274 Pages
by Routledge

274 Pages
by Routledge

274 Pages
by Routledge

Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have... Read more

1. Introduction

Part 1: Metaethics The Descriptive Consequences of Moral Disagreement

2. Explaining Moral Disagreement

3. Making Room for Disagreement

4. Interpreting Moral Disagreements

Part 2: Epistemology and Normative Ethics Normative Personal Consequences of Moral Disagreement

5. The Epistemic Significance of Peer Disagreement

6. Applied Epistemology of Moral Disagreement

7. From What We Ought to Believe to What We Ought to Do

Part 3: Political Philosophy Normative Interpersonal Consequences of Moral Disagreement

8. Moral Compromise

9. Public Reason, Legitimate State Action, and Justifiability to All

10. Democracy and Deliberative Restraint

Part 4: Metaethics and Disagreement’s Normative Implications

11. Metaethics and the Normative Implications of Moral Disagreement

Conclusion.

Glossary

Bibliography

Index

Biography

Rach Cosker-Rowland is an Associate Professor in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds, UK. They are the author of The Normative and the Evaluative (2019), and the co-editor of Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Routledge, 2019).