Moral Inferences is the first volume to thoroughly explore the relationship between morality and reasoning. Drawing on the expertise of world-leading researchers, this text provides ground-breaking insight into the importance of studying these distinct fields together.
The volume integrates the latest research into morality with current theories in reasoning to consider the prominent role reasoning plays in everyday moral judgements. Featuring contributions on topics such as moral arguments, causal models, and dual process theory, this text provides a new perspectives on previous studies, encouraging researchers to adopt a more integrated approach in the future.
Moral Inferences will be essential reading for students and researchers of moral psychology, specifically those interested in reasoning, rationality and decision-making.
Table of contents
- Is morality unified, and does this matter for moral reasoning?
- Causal Models Mediate Moral Inferences
- The shadow and the tree: inference and transformation of cognitive content in psychology of moral judgment
- Reasons-based moral judgment and the erotetic theory
- The power of moral arguments
- Dual processes and conflict during moral and logical reasoning: a case for utilitarian intuitions?
- Utilitarian vs. deontological reasoning: method, results, and theory
- Archimedes in the lab: Can science identify good moral reasoning?
- Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical Thought
- Exile of the accidental witch: Character and intention in an uncertain social world
Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière
PART 1: INPUTS
Geoffrey P. Goodwin
Michael Waldmann, Alex Wiegmann and Jonas Nagel
Edward Royzman & John Paul Hagan
PART 2: PROCESSES
Philipp Koralus and Mark Alfano
Mercier, Castelain, Hamid andMar´ın Picado
Wim De Neys and Michal Bialek
PART 3: OUTPUTS
Regina Rini and Tommaso Bruni
Eric Schwitzgebel and Jonathan Ellis