Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.
Table of Contents
Introduction; Chapter 1 Bosnia and the Transatlantic Problem; Chapter 2 Dayton and the American Problem; Chapter 3 Kosovo and the Struggle for Unity; Chapter 4 The Western Alliance and its Balkan Protectorates; Conclusion;
Dana H. Allin