This book focuses primarily on the U.S.–USSR relationship and includes case studies of crisis management among non-superpowers. It addresses the important question of how human control can be maximized in situations of international crisis.
Table of Contents
Introduction Part One: Theory and Practice 1. Crisis Management: A Critical Appraisal 2. Clausewitz, Loss of Control, and Crisis Management Part Two: Superpower Relations 3. U.S.-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of Competition 4. Arms Control Negotiations and the Stability of Crisis Management Part Three: Nuclear Crisis Management 5. Enhancing Crisis Stability: Correcting the Trend Toward Increasing Instability 6. Approaches to Nuclear Risk Reduction Part Four: Crisis Management in Regional Context 7. The Managed and the Managers: Crisis Prevention in the Middle East 8. Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: Concepts and Processes 9. Conclusion