1st Edition
North Korea’s Nuclear Decisions and Strategies Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and the Bomb
Introduction
1. From Tributary to Colony to Divided State: Korean Sovereignty in a Changing World
Part I. Bipolar Order in the Cold War
Section Introduction
2. Liberated Korea in a Bipolar Atomic Order
3. From Armistice to Atomic Ambitions: Planting the Seeds of Nuclear Latency
4. Roots of Nuclear Resolve: Kim Il Sung’s Proliferation Decision
5. Seoul’s Cold War Triumph and Pyongyang’s Nuclear Subterfuge
Part II. Unipolar Order in the Post-Cold War
Section Introduction
6. North Korea’s Nuclear Path to Legitimacy
7. Brinkmanship and Diplomacy: Negotiating with North Korea
Part III. World Disorder and the Post-September 11 Era
Section Introduction
8. Kim Jong Il’s Nuclear Acquisition Decision
9. Kim Jong Un’s Race Against Sanctions and the Ripening of North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine
10. Conclusion
Biography
George A. Hutchinson is the author of Army of the Indoctrinated: The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA. He is the editor of the International Journal of Korean Studies and holds a doctorate from George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. A retired U.S. Air Force veteran, he served as both a Logistics Readiness officer and Korean linguist. He currently works as a consultant supporting and advising basing issues in the Republic of Korea.
"This is a book filled with thought provoking analysis and policy-relevant assessments. Hutchinson crafts a work that will be must reading for policy makers, scholars, and anyone who has an interest in understanding Pyongyang’s geopolitical goals and actions.”
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Professor of Political Science, Angelo State University, USA
“George A. Hutchinson's extraordinary study provides readers with a deep and exacting account of the North Korean regime's relentless quest for the atomic weaponry, and helps us make sense of the motivations and calculations behind the Kim dynasty's dogged, three-generation pursuit of nuclear status. Like them or not, scholars and policymakers will ignore his conclusions at their own peril.”
Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), USA
