1st Edition

Nuclear Alliance Restraint Success and Failure in Countering Allied Proliferators

By Dong Sun Lee, Iordanka Alexandrova Copyright 2025
198 Pages 2 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

198 Pages 2 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

198 Pages 2 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case... Read more

1. Introduction  2. Polarity, Geography, and Nuclear Alliance Restraint  3. The American Success to Denuclearize South Korea, 1970–1982  4. The Chinese Failure to Disarm North Korea, 1993–2016  5. The Soviet Failure to Restrain the Chinese Nuclear Armament, 1954–1966  6. The US Failure to Denuclearize Pakistan, 1991–2000  7. Comprehensive Investigation  8. Conclusion: Nuclear Alliance Restraint Now and After Unipolarity

Biography

Dong Sun Lee is a Professor of International Relations at Korea University, Seoul, South Korea. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is the author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict (2008).

Iordanka Alexandrova is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University of Science and Technology, South Korea. She has a PhD in Political Science from Korea University.

'Nuclear Alliance Restraint is a fascinating and well-researched book that explains when powerful states are likely to prevent their weaker allies from acquiring nuclear weapons. Whereas many experts fear increased nuclear proliferation now that unipolarity has ended and great-power competition is back with a vengeance, Lee and Alexandrova argue the opposite. Let’s hope they are right!'

John J. MearsheimerR. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, USA

'Nuclear Alliance Restraint adopts a bold approach to understanding a crucially important question—under what conditions do powerful states fail to stop weaker allies from acquiring nuclear weapons? The authors develop a structural theory that focuses on polarity—the number of superpowers—and geography. Their high-level theory provides a parsimonious, yet nuanced, understanding of the credibility and leverage of the major power’s carrots and sticks, and produces crucial insights that are missing from theories that focus instead on the characteristics of individual states. Nuclear Alliance Restraint greatly advances our understanding of nuclear proliferation, as well as the dynamics of asymmetric alliances.'

Charles L. GlaserSenior Fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program and Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, USA