1st Edition

On Frege Puzzles Why Propositions Are Not the Objects of Our Mental Attitudes

By Stefan Rinner Copyright 2026
230 Pages
by Routledge

230 Pages
by Routledge

This book argues against the received view of propositional theory, according to which mental attitudes—such as believing, knowing, hoping, and wishing—are relations held between agents and propositions. Roughly speaking, propositions are primary bearers of truth that are neither sentences nor utterances of sentences, be it of a public language or of a language of thought. This book argues that... Read more

Introduction
1. Frege’s Puzzle
2. Frege Puzzles for Fregeans
3 Frege Puzzles for Russellians
4. Propositionalism and Schiffer’s Puzzle
5. Rejecting Relationalism

Biography

Stefan Rinner is an assistant professor at the University of Duisburg-Essen. His research focuses on the philosophy of language and related areas, including propositional attitude ascriptions and the semantics of referring expressions. He has published several articles on these topics in leading journals, such as Synthese and Erkenntnis.