1st Edition

On Justifying Moral Judgements (Routledge Revivals)

By Lawrence C. Becker Copyright 1973
    214 Pages
    by Routledge

    214 Pages
    by Routledge

    Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited.

    The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the ‘is-ought’ issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument.

    Preface;  1. Introduction  2. Axiology, Deontology and Agent Morality  3. Values and Justification Procedure  4. Five Types of Valuation  5. More on Valuation  6. Evaluation  7. Grounding Value Judgment  8. Grounding Value Judgments (continued)  9. Matters of Moral Concern  10. Grounding Deontic Judgments  11. Three Issues Concerning the Arguments so far 1 2. Why Be Moral?  13. The Concept of Responsibility  14. Responsible Agency  15. Avoiding the Free Will Issue  16. Justifying Attributions of Responsibility  17. Justifying Sanctions  18. Justifying Ascriptions of Responsibility  19. Agent Morality: The Concepts of Justice and a Good Man  20. Concluding Remarks;  Index

    Biography

    Lawrence C. Becker