"The notion that every state has an interest in the territorial integrity of every other state-no matter how distant they are and how slight their connections-is peculiar to the twentieth century. To be sure, poets and philosophers had perceived humanity's common interest in preventing wars, and statesmen had found that aggression from outside the community could be deterred by the mutual defense of those within it. But no one had ever tried to organize an all-embracing system that used the collective force of its members to prevent one of them from attacking another. It took the wide devastation of two world wars-and the failure of the balance-of-power systems that preceded them-to instigate the search for a more effective way to manage power. To the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations there was nothing extravagant about the idea that peace is indivisible. Their countries had been drawn into wars that were largely not of their making: They had learned that to control their destinies they must act early, with others, to keep the peace. It is this core of national self-interest that drives collective security. If the system works at any moment in history, it is because its members believe they have enough stake in the existing order to warrant taking measures against any nation that threatens to destroy the fabric of that order. "
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments -- Introduction and Summary -- 1. Collective Security and Its Antecedents -- Early Variations of Collective Security. -- The Classical Balance-of-Power System -- The Collapse of the Old Order -- 2. Collective Security in the League of Nations Scheme -- The Nature of Sanctions Under the Covenant -- Early Successes in Conflict Prevention -- Appeasement and the Breakdown of the System -- Japanese Aggression and the League Response -- The Italo-Ethiopian War and the Problems of Sanctions -- 3. The UN Charter Approach to Managing Power Allied Assumptions About the Postwar Order, U.S. Domestic and International Security Considerations -- Key Issues at Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, and Yalta -- The UN Charter in a Changing World Order -- 4. Collective Force Theory and National Power -- Power Maximization as the Basis of Foreign Policy. -- Limits on the Pursuit of Power: The Case of Containment -- Balance-of-Power Responses to New Forms of Power -- Implications of Weapons of Mass Destruction for Collective Security -- Collective Security and Its Critics -- The Heart of the Sovereignty Problem -- Limits on the Use of Collective Force in Democracies -- 5. Patterns for a UN Force: The Five-Power Talks of 1946 -- The Key Issues: Force Size and Permanent-Member Contributions -- Authority and Control, Strategic Direction, and Tactical Command -- Implications for an International Deterrent Force -- 6. Korea and the Limits of Voluntary Enforcement Action -- Launching a Voluntary Operation -- The Rise and Fall of General Assembly Support -- Numbers, Effectiveness, and Size of National Contingents -- Problems in the Termination of an Ad Hoc Operation -- 7. Peacekeeping and Peaceful Settlement: Namibia and the Arab-Israeli Dispute -- Changing Patterns of Regional Conflict After the Cold War -- Nation Building Since the Cold War: The Case of Namibia -- Other Uses of Force in the Post-Cold War Era -- The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Dispute -- 8. The Gulf War and Its Implications for an International Deterrent Force -- Post-Cold War Dynamics in the Security Council -- Legal Authority for the Use of Force Against Iraq -- Issues of Strategic Direction, Command, and Consultations -- Ad Hoc Coalitions Versus Charter-Based UN Deterrent Forces -- The Uses of an International Deterrent System in the Gulf Crisis -- 9. Somalia and the Ambiguities of Peace Enforcement -- The Impact of the Cold War -- Distributing Humanitarian Relief Against Armed Opposition -- Logistical Aid as an Alternative to the Use of Force -- Domestic and Foreign-Policy Consequences -- The Ambiguities of "Peace Enforcement -- 10. Problems on the Path to an International Deterrent -- System -- Appendix: The Charter of the United Nations -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
Joseph P. Lorenz is at the U.S. Institute for Peace.