1600 Pages
    by Routledge

    Edited by a leading scholar in the field, Philosophy of Law is a new title in the Routledge Major Works series Critical Concepts in Philosophy. It is a four-volume collection of canonical and cutting-edge research and covers a significant range of topics in the field.

    The first two volumes of the collection are devoted primarily to analytical legal theory—in particular, theories about the nature of law. This is the idea of legal philosophy most familiar to jurisprudential students in the English-speaking world, and many of the civil-law countries. The last two volumes sample schools and theorists who mostly come from outside the analytical tradition, and who are, in one sense or another, critical theorists—theorists more interested in offering systematic critiques of law or general prescriptions.

    The four volumes of the collection are divided into six parts. Part one brings together key work on the methodology of analytical philosophy and Part two collects the most important scholarship on forms of legal positivism, including material in the Austin–Hart tradition, ‘inclusive vs. exclusive legal positivism’ and Kelsenian legal positivism. Part three (‘Critics of Legal Positivism’) gathers material in the natural-law tradition; the work and influence of Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin are also fully explored here.

    Parts four to six are an assembly of the best and most important thinking by and about normative and critical theorists working outside the analytical tradition. Part four gathers material under the rubric of legal realism, exploring both the American and Scandinavian schools as well as their predecessors. Part five examines one of the most influential movements in modern legal theory and legal practice: known as ‘law and economics’ or the ‘economic analysis of law’, this approach has come to dominate American scholarship, and its role is growing in other countries too. Finally, part six makes available key research on a variety of critical theories of law that have grown up around systematic critiques of Western legal systems. Included here is work by the American legal realists, as well as work by feminists and scholars pursuing critical race theory. The intersection of law and literature is also examined, as are other approaches to law and legal theory: Habermas’s ‘proceduralist paradigm’; the concept of ‘autopoiesis’; and the work of Rorty and Fish.

    This Routledge Major Work illustrates the many ways in which philosophical methods and theories have been used to explore aspects of law and legal practice, and with a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Philosophy of Law is an essential collection destined to be valued by scholars and students as a vital research resource.

    VOLUME 1

    Part 1: Analytical Legal Philosophy—Methodology

    A. General Considerations

    1. Robert Alexy, ‘The Nature of Legal Philosophy’, Ratio Juris, vol. 17 (2004): 156–67

    2. John Gardner, ‘The Legality of Law’, Ratio Juris, vol. 17 (2004): 168–81

    B. Conceptual Analysis

    3. Brian Bix, ‘Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence’, Legal Theory, vol. 1 (1995): 465–79

    4. Joseph Raz, ‘On the Nature of Law’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, vol. 82 (1996): 1–25

    5. Brian H. Bix, ‘Raz on Necessity’, Law and Philosophy, vol. 22 (2003): 537–59

    6. Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 24 (2004): 1–37

    C. Naturalist Challenge to Conceptual Analysis

    7. Brian Leiter, ‘Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence’, American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 48 (2003): 17–51

    Part 2: Legal Positivism

    A. Early Legal Positivism

    8. Robert J. Moles, ‘John Austin Reconsidered’, Northern Irish Legal Quarterly, vol. 36 (1985): 193–221

    9. Brian Bix, ‘John Austin’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 edition)

    10. David Lyons, ‘Logic and Coercion in Bentham’s Theory of Law’, Cornell Law Review, vol. 57 (1972): 335–62

    B. Hartian Legal Positivism

    11. H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 71 (1958): 593–629

    12. Leslie Green, ‘The Concept of Law Revisited’, Michigan Law Review, vol. 94 (1996): 1687–717

    13. Thomas Morawetz, ‘Law as Experience: Theory and the Internal Aspect of Law’, SMU Law Review, vol. 52 (1999): 27–66

    VOLUME 2

    C. Inclusive vs. Exclusive Legal Positivism

    14. Joseph Raz, ‘Authority, Law and Morality’, Monist, vol. 68 (1985): 295–324

    15. Jules L. Coleman, ‘Constraints on the Criteria of Legality’, Legal Theory, vol. 6 (2000): 171–83.

    16. Scott J. Shapiro, ‘Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct’, Legal Theory, vol. 6 (2000): 127–70.

    17. W. J. Waluchow, ‘Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis’, Legal Theory, vol. 6 (2000): 45–81

    18. Joseph Raz, ‘Incorporation by Law’, Legal Theory, vol. 10 (2004): 1–17

    D. Kelsenian Legal Positivism

    19. Hans Kelsen, ‘What is the Pure Theory of Law?’, Tulane Law Review, vol. 34 (1960): 269–76

    20. Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 55 (1941): 44–70

    21. Hans Kelsen, ‘On the Basic Norm’, California Law Review, vol. 47 (1959): 107–10

    22. Stanley L. Paulson, ‘The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 12 (1992): 311–32

    23. Eugenio Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, Ratio Juris, vol. 3 (1990): 29–45

    Part 3. Critics of Legal Positivism

    A. Natural Law Tradition

    24. Anton-Hermann Chroust and Frederick A. Collins, Jr., ‘The Basic Ideas in the Philosophy of Law of St Thomas Aquinas as Found in the "Summa Theologica"’, Marquette Law Review, vol. 26 (1941): 11–29

    25. John Finnis, ‘Natural Law and Legal Reasoning’, Cleveland State Law Review, vol. 38 (1990): 1–13

    26. John Finnis, ‘The "Natural Law Tradition"’, Journal of Legal Education, vol. 36 (1986): 492–5

    27. John Finnis, ‘On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism’, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 75 (2000): 1597–611

    28. Brian Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism’, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 75 (2000): 1613–24

    29. Mark C. Murphy, ‘Natural Law Jurisprudence’, Legal Theory, vol. 9 (2003): 241–67

    B. Lon Fuller

    30. Lon L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 71 (1958): 630–72

    31. Matthew Kramer, ‘Scrupulousness Without Scruples: A Critique of Lon Fuller and His Defenders’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 18 (1998): 235–63

    C. Ronald Dworkin

    32. Ronald Dworkin, ‘Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense’, in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1987): pp. 9–20

    33. Nicos Stavropoulos, ‘Interpretivist Theories of Law’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 edition)

    34. Joseph Raz, ‘Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain’, California Law Review, vol. 74 (1986): 1103–19

    35. John Finnis, ‘On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire’, Law and Philosophy, vol. 6 (1987): 357–80

    VOLUME 3

    Part 4: Normative and Critical Theory I: Legal Realism

    A. American Legal Realism, and Predecessors

    36. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 10 (1897): 457–78

    37. Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 44 (1931): 1222–64

    38. Felix S. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Response’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 35 (1935): 809–49

    39. Robert L. Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 38 (1923): 470–94

    40. Alf Ross, ‘Tû-Tû’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 70 (1957): 812–25

    41. Karl Olivecrona, ‘The Legal Theories of Axel Hägerström and Vilhelm Lundstedt’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 3 (1959): 125–50

    Part 5: Normative and Critical Theory II: Rational Choice Theory

    A. Economic Analysis of Law

    42. R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3 (1960): 1–44

    43. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 85 (1972): 1089–128

    44. Arthur Allen Leff, ‘Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism’, Virginia Law Review, vol. 60 (1974): 451–82

    45. Richard A. Posner, ‘Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations’, Ratio Juris, vol. 17 (2004): 66–79

    B. Game Theory

    46. Randal C. Picker, ‘Law and Economics: Intellectual Arbitrage’, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, vol. 27 (1993): 127–46

    C. Public Choice Theory

    47. Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, ‘The Jurisprudence of Public Choice’, Texas Law Review, vol. 65 (1987): 873–927

    D. Behavioural Law and Economics

    48. Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Behavioral Analysis of Law’, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 64 (1997): 1175–95

    VOLUME 4

    Part 6: Normative and Critical Theory III: Modern Critical Theories

    A. Critical Legal Studies

    49. Duncan Kennedy, ‘Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy’, Journal of Legal Education, vol. 32 (1982): 591–615

    50. Morton J. Horwitz, ‘Rights’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, vol. 23 (1988): 393–406

    51. Paul D. Carrington, ‘Of Law and the River’, Journal of Legal Education, vol. 34 (1984): 222–8

    B. Feminist Legal Theory

    52. Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 100 (1991): 1281–328

    53. Robin L. West, ‘The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory’, Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal, vol. 15 (2000): 149–215

    C. Critical Race Theory

    54. Derrick Bell, ‘Racial Realism’, Connecticut Law Review, vol. 24 (1992): 363–79

    55. Mari Matsuda, ‘Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground’, Harvard Women’s Law Journal, vol. 11 (1988): 1–17

    56. Gerald Torres, ‘Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice—Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon’, Minnesota Law Review, vol. 75 (1991): 993–1007

    D. Law and Literature

    57. James Boyd White, ‘What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 102 (1989): 2014–47

    58. Robert M. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 95 (1986): 1601–29

    E. Habermas and Legal Theory

    59. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Paradigms of Law’, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 17 (1996): 771–84

    F. Autopoiesis

    60. Niklas Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System’, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 13 (1992): 1419–41

    G. Pragmatism and Postmodernism

    61. Richard Rorty, ‘The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice’, Southern California Law Review, vol. 63 (1990): 1811–19

    62. Stanley Fish, ‘Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 96 (1987): 1773–1800