1st Edition
Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism Philosophical Perspectives
Introduction Alessandra Tanesini and Michael P. Lynch
Part I: Argumentation, bias and arrogance
1. Reassessing different conceptions of argumentation Catarina Dutilh Novaes
2. Martial metaphors and argumentative virtues and vices Ian James Kidd
3. Arrogance and deep disagreement Andrew Aberdein
4. Closed-mindedness and arrogance Heather Battaly
Part II: Trust, dogmatism and arrogance in social contexts
5. Intellectual trust and the marketplace of ideas Allan Hazlett
6. Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant? J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon
7. Intellectual humility and the curse of knowledge Michael Hannon
8. Bullshit and dogmatism: A discourse analytical perspective Chris Heffer
Part III: Polarisation
9. Polarisation and the problem of spreading arrogance Michael P. Lynch
10. Arrogance, polarisation and arguing to win Alessandra Tanesini
11. Partisanship, humility, and epistemic polarisation Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rose Graves, Gus Skorburg, Mark Leary, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
12. Science denial, polarisation, and arrogance Lee McIntyre
13. The polarisation toolkit Quassim Cassam
14. Epistemic rights in a polarised world: the right to know and the abortion debate Lani Watson
Index
Biography
Alessandra Tanesini is Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, UK.
Michael P. Lynch is Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, USA.
