This unusual history of the first four secretaries-general of NATO and their importance in the post-war politics of Western defense is a study of diplomacy–of individuals and the impact of their personalities on international events. It can perhaps best be described in terms of what it is not. It is not, for example, exclusively a book on NATO, nor is it a text on international organization. It is neither a history of European politics nor an analysis of East-West relations. It is not a specialized study of nuclear politics, and it does not pretend to be a record of the political interplay between the United States and its European allies. Yet all of these themes appear in the work. In the course of preparing this book, Dr. Jordan came to know the four secretaries-general, as well as many other individuals involved in NATO since its inception. While his analysis is objective and he has thoroughly documented his observations, there is also a valuable personal element in his assessment of the impact the persons who occupied this relatively little known but very important office had on the institution they headed and the international political environment in which they operated.
Introduction -- Lord Ismay: The "Old Soldier" Turned Diplomat, 1952–1957 -- Paul-Henri Spaak's Effort at Forging an Alliance Diplomacy, 1957–1961 -- Dirk Stikker: Caught Between Détente, France, and Europe, 1961-1964 -- Manlio Brosio: A Diplomat's Diplomat, 1964–1971 -- Conclusion: Can the Office Transcend the Organization? -- Leading NATO Figures, 1952–1971 -- The North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949 -- Selection from the Report of the Committee of Three on Nonmilitary Cooperation in NATO, December 1956 -- The "Athens Guidelines," May 1962 -- The Ottawa Decisions (Nuclear Planning), May 1963 -- The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), December 1967 -- Appendix 7: Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Czechoslovakia), November 1968