1600 Pages 219 B/W Illustrations
    by Routledge

    The COVID-19 pandemic, coming on the heels of the Eurozone Debt Crisis, financial crisis and Great Recession, has provoked a renewed interest in the determinants of public borrowing. By nature an interdisciplinary subject, public borrowing draws from fields as diverse as macroeconomics, finance, law, history, politics and sociology. This new four volume collection will systematically survey this vast and disparate literature, gathering together the key writings and research to provide an essential research resource.

    Volume I: The Advent of Modern Public Borrowing

    Editor Acknowledgements


    Introduction to volume I

    1. Werner Baer, ‘Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations’, Latin American Research Review 7, 1, 1972, 95-122.

    2. Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, ‘Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 1983, 101-121.

    3. Allan Drazen and Paul R. Masson, ‘Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policy Makers’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1994, 735–754.

    4. Switgard Feurstein and Oliver Grimm, ‘On the Credibility of Currency Boards’, Review of International Economics 14, 5, 2006, 818–835.

    5. Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History 59, 4, 1989, 803-832.

    6. Larry D. Neal, ‘The Bank of England’s First Return to Gold and the Stock Market Crash of 1825,’ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 79 (May/June), 1998, 53-76.

    7. Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth’, American Economic Review 88, 3, 1998, 537-558.

    8. Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Contagion and Capital Market Integration in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Evidence’, Seoul Journal of Economics 12, 4, 1999, 391–417.

    9. Marc Flandreau, ‘Caveat Emptor: Coping with Sovereign Risk Under the International Gold Standard, 1871-1913’, Marc Flandreau, Marc, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich and James, Harold (eds), International Financial History in the Twentieth Century: System and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 17-50.

    10. Sebastian Edwards, ‘LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical Investigation, 1976–80’, American Economic Review 74, 4, 1984, 726–734.

    11. Marc Flandreau, ‘The French Crime of 1873: An Essay in the Emergence of the International Gold Standard, 1870–1880’, Journal of Economic History 56, 4, 1996, 862–897.

    12. Michael Bordo and Hugh Rockoff, ‘The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval"’, Journal of Economic History, LVI, 1996, 389–428.

    13. Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, ‘The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880-1913’, Journal of Economic History 66, 2, 2006, 283-312.

    14. Adam Tooze and Martin Ivanov, ‘Disciplining the "Black Sheep of the Balkans": Financial Supervision and Sovereignty in Bulgaria, 1902–1938’, Economic History Review 64, 2011, 30–51.

    Volume II: The Washington Consensus and its Critics


    Introduction to volume II

    15. Philippe Aghion, Abhijit V. Banerjee and Phillippe Bacchetta, ‘Financial Development and the Instability of Open Economies’, NBER Working Paper No. w10246, (January 2004).

    16. Amadou N. R. Sy, ‘Emerging Market Bond Spreads and Sovereign Credit Ratings: Reconciling Market Views with Economic Fundamentals’, IMF Working Paper 01/165, 2001.

    17. Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, ‘Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review October 1996, 37–54,.

    18. Gianluigi Ferrucci, ‘Empirical Determinants of Emerging Market Economies’ Sovereign Bond Spreads’, Working Paper No. 205. Bank of England, London, 2003.

    19. Heather D. Gibson, Stephen G. Hall and George S. Tavlas, ‘The Greek Financial Crisis: Growing Imbalances and Sovereign Spreads’, Journal of International Money and Finance 31, 2012, 498–516.

    20. Rudiger Dornbusch, ‘Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics’, Journal of Political Economy 84, 6, 1976, 1161-1176.

    21. Guillermo A. Calvo and Carmen M. Reinhart, ‘Fear of Floating’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 2, 2002, 379-408.

    22. Stanley Fischer, ‘Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 2, 2001, 3-24.

    23. Paul Krugman, ‘Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang’, Journal of Development Economics 29, 3, 1998, 253-268.

    24. Cesar Martinelli and Mariano Tommasi. ‘Sequencing of Economics Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints’, Economics and Politics 9, 2, 1997, 115-131.

    25. Ronald I. McKinnnon and Huw Pill, ‘Credible Economic Liberalizations and Overborrowing’, American Economic Review 87, 2, 1997, 189-193.

    26. Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Growth 9, 2, 2004, 131-165.

    27. Stanley L., Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, ‘Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States’, in Stephen Haber (ed.) How Latin America Fell Behind (Stanford University Press, California, 1997), pp. 260-304.

    28. Joseì Antonio Ocampo, ‘Capital-Account and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulations in Developing Countries’, in Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Stephany Griffith-Jones (eds), From Capital Surges to Drought: Seeking Stability for Emerging Markets (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2003), pp. 217-244.

    29. Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability’, World Development 28, 6, 2000, 1075-1086.

    30. Nancy Birdsall, Augusto de la Torre and Felipe Valencia Caicedo,The Washington Consensus: Assessing a Damaged Brand’, World Bank Working Paper 213, 2010.

    31. J. Williamson, ‘What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?’, World Bank Economic Review 15, 2, 2000, 251-264.


    Volume III: The Role of Fiscal Policy


    Introduction to volume II


    32. Torben M. Andersen, ‘Fiscal Policy Targeting Under Imperfect Information’, Journal of International Money and Finance 34, April, 2013, 114-130.

    33. Olivier Blanchard, ‘Current Account Deficits in Rich Countries’, IMF Staff Papers 54, 2, 2007, 191–219.

    34. Emanuele Baldacci and Manmohan S. Kumar, ‘Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt, and Sovereign Bond Yields’, IMF Working Paper 10/184, 2010.

    35. Theodore M. Barnhill, Jr. and George Kopits, ‘Assessing Fiscal Sustainability Under Uncertainty’, Working Paper 03/79, International Monetary Fund, 2003.

    36. Finn E. Kydland and Edward Prescott, ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, Journal of Political Economy 85, 1977, 473-491.

    37. George Kopits, ‘Overview of Fiscal Policy Rules in Emerging Markets’, in G. Kopits (ed.), Rules-based Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 1-12.

    38. Evan Tanner and Issouf Samaka, ‘Probabilistic Sustainability of Public Debt: A Vector Autoregression Approach for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey’, IMF Working Papers 06/295, International Monetary Fund, 2006.

    39. Marcio Garcia and Roberto Rigobon,‘A Risk Management Approach to Emerging Markets’ Sovereign Debt Sustainability with an Application to Brazilian Data’, in F. Giovazzi, I. Goldfajn and S. Herrera (eds), Inflation Targeting, Debt and the Brazilian Experience 1999 to 2003 (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 163-188.

    40. R. Hausmann, ‘Good Credit Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure’, in G. Kopits (ed.), Rules-based Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 30-52.

    41. Roel Beetsma and Harald Uhlig, ‘An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact’, Economic Journal 109, 458, 1999, 546–71.

    42. Martin Feldstein, ‘The Political Economy of a European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 4, 1997, 23–42.

    43. Guglielmo Caporale, Michael Chui, Stephen G. Hall and Brian Henry, ‘Fiscal Consolidation: An Exercise in the Methodology of Coordination’, Journal of Economic Integration 20, 1, 2005, 1-25.

    44. Jordi Gali and Tommaso Monacelli, ‘Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union’, Journal of International Economics 76, 1, 116–32.

    45. F. Coricelli and V. Ercolani. ‘Fiscal Rules on the Road to an Enlarged European Union’, in G. Kopits (ed.), Rules-based Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 146-163.

    46. Jaime Caruana and Stefan Adjiev, ‘Sovereign Creditworthiness and Financial Stability: An International Perspective’, Banque de France Financial Stability Review 16, April 2012, 71–85.

    Volume IV: Market Microstructure, Creditor Action and Contagion


    Introduction to volume II


    47. F. Allen and D. Gale, ‘Financial Contagion’, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1, 2000, 1-33.

    48. J. D. Amato, ‘Risk Aversion and Risk Premia in the CDS Market’, BIS Quarterly Review Part 5, December, 2005, 55–68.

    49. M. G. Arghyrou and J. D. Tsoukalas, ‘The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes, Mechanics and Outcomes’, World Economy 34, 2011, 173–191.

    50. J. Beirne and M. Fratzscher, ‘The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and Contagion During the European Sovereign Debt Crisis’, Journal of International Money and Finance 34, 2013, 60–82.

    51. G. A. Karolyi, ‘Does International Finance Contagion Really Exist?’, International Finance 6, 2, 2003, 179-199.

    52. Fabio Fornari and Livio Stracca, ‘What Does a Financial Shock Do? First International Evidence’, Economic Policy 27, 71, 2012, 407-445.

    53. Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin and Stefano Rossi, ‘Banks, Government Bonds, and Default: What Do the Data Say?’, (July 2014). IMF Working Paper No. 14/120.

    54. N. M. Boyson, C. W. Stahel and R. M. Stulz, ‘Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks’, Journal of Finance 65, 5, 2010, 1789–1816.

    55. M. K. Brunnermeier and L.H. Pedersen, ‘Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity’, Review of Financial Studies 22, 6, 2009, 2201-2238.

    56. G. Dell’Ariccia, I. Schnabel and J. Zettelmeyer, ‘How do Official Bailouts Affect the Risk of Investing in Emerging Markets?’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 38, 2006, 1689–1714.

    57. R. Pitchford and M. L. J. Wright, ‘On the Contribution of Game Theory to the Study of Sovereign Debt and Default’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 29, 4, 2013, 649-667.



    Tehreem Husain is a doctoral candidate at the Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction. She previously worked at the Monetary Policy Department of the State Bank of Pakistan. 

    D’Maris Coffman PhD FRHistS FSA SFHEA is Professor in Economics and Finance of the Built Environment at University College London. She is the Director of the Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction. She is also a Visiting Professor at Renmin University of China’s School of Public Policy and Administration and at the University of Milan’s Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods.