There are many deep-seated reasons for the current financial turmoil but a key factor has undoubtedly been the serious failings within the corporate governance practices of financial institutions. There have been shortcomings in the risk management and incentive structures; the boards’ supervision was at times weak; disclosure and accounting standards were in some cases inadequate; the institutional investors’ engagement with management was at times insufficient and, last but not least, the remuneration policies of many large institutions appeared inappropriate. This book will provide a critical overview and analysis of key corporate governance weaknesses, focusing primarily on three main areas: directors’ failure to understand complex company transactions; the poor remuneration practices of financial institutions; and, finally, the failure of institutional investors to sufficiently engage with management. The book, while largely focused on the UK, will also consider EU and Australian developments as well as offering a comparative angle looking at the corporate governance of financial institutions in the US.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Sharpening Bankers’ Personal Accountability 2. The Theoretical Justification of Executive Remuneration as an Incentive Mechanism 3. Shareholder Engagement and Activism: An Effective Mechanism for Monitoring Management or a Fallacious Notion? 4. Executive Remuneration and Shareholders’ Voice in the United States Epilogue
Demetra Arsalidou is a senior lecturer at Cardiff University, UK.