Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years.
Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions:
- What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work?
- How effective are they?
- How can they be reinforced?
- What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance?
IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.
Table of Contents
Foreword. Preface. Glossary. Part 1: International Safeguards David Fischer 1. Overview 2. The Three Main Elements 3. The Political Framework and Constraints 4. The Technical Basis 5. The Risk of Secret Nuclear Plants 6. Limits to the Present Approach 7. Problems with Safeguards Methods 8. Problems with Safeguards Procedures 9. SAGSI and SIR 10. Regional Safeguards Systems, EURATOM and Japan 11. Defects of the Safeguards Documents 12. The IAEA's Interfaces with States 13. Trigger Lists, the London Club and INFCE 14. New Institutions 15. The Need for New Perceptions 16. IAEA Safeguards and Arms Control Part 2: Sanctions Paul Szasz. IAEA Safeguards: Sanctions Part 3: Conclusions and Recommendations Appendix 1. Facts about the IAEA. Appendix 2. Safeguards Techniques and Equipment. Appendix 3. Nuclear Plants Under Construction or Operating in the Developing Countries Outside Europe (Power and Research Reactors and Significant Fuel Facilities). Appendix 4. The IAEA Safeguards System of 1965-68, INFCIRC/66 Rev. 2. Appendix 5. The IAEA Model NPT Safeguards Agreement of 1971, INFCIRC/153. Appendix 6. Duration and Termination of INFCIRC/66 Agreements, GOV/1621 of 1973. Appendix 7. The IAEA Inspector's Document of 1961, GC(V)INF/39. Appendix 8. Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of 1977, INFCIRC/254. Appendix 9. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Appendix 10. Status of the Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of the NPT Safeguards Agreements, as of 1 January 1985. Appendix 11. Non-NPT Safeguards Agreement. Index.
David Fischer, Paul Szasz
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide.