1540 Pages
    by Routledge

    Socrates is perhaps the most famous philosopher in the Western intellectual tradition. He raised fundamental questions, such as ‘what is justice?’ and ‘does virtue produce happiness?’. Although he wrote nothing himself, he is the source of a vast literature, beginning with Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, and continuing to the present day.

    In the two decades since the first Routledge Critical Assessments collection on Socrates was prepared for publication (Socrates (1996) (978-0-415-10968-0)), scholarly work has blossomed anew, not least in response to Gregory Vlastos’s Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher and Charles Kahn’s Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. This new Routledge anthology, compiled by the editor of the first collection, takes full account of the many important developments that have taken place since the mid-1990s. Socrates II assembles in one easy-to-use resource the major works produced by established and rising scholars in this period on the topics covered in the original collection. It also gathers the very best material on additional themes, including:

    • the possibility of Socratic Studies;
    • Socratic irony;
    • Socratic metaphysics;
    • Socratic moral psychology; and
    • Socrates on love.

    With a full index, together with a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Socrates II is an indispensable work of reference. It will interest not only scholars in the History of Philosophy, but also those working in Law, Political Science, and the History of Greek Religion.

    Socrates II Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers Table of Contents (final)

    Volume I

    Principles of Selection

    General Introduction on Socrates

    Introduction to volume I

    Part 1. The "Socratic Problem"

    1. Debra Nails, ‘Problems with Vlastos’s Platonic Developmentalism’, Ancient Philosophy 13, 1993,
    2. 273-291.

    3. Donald Morrison, ‘On the Alleged Historical Reliability of Plato’s Apology’, Archiv für Geschichte
    4. der Philosophie 82, 2000, 235-265

    5. Terry Penner, ‘The Historical Socrates and Plato’s Early Dialogues: Some Philosophical Questions’, in Julia Annas and Christopher Rowe (eds), New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient (Center for Hellenic Studies, 2002), pp. 189-212.
    6. Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, ‘Apology for Socratic Studies’, Polis 20, 2003, 108-127.
    7. William Prior, ‘Socrates Metaphysician’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27, 2004, 1-14.
    8. David Wolfsdorf, ‘Interpreting Plato’s Early Dialogues’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
    9. 27, 2004, 15-40.

    10. Catherine Osborne, ‘Socrates in the Platonic Dialogues’, Philosophical Investigations 29, 2006,
    11. 1-21.

    12. Lloyd Gerson, ‘The Myth of Plato’s Socratic Period’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96,
    13. 2014, 403-430.

      Part 2. Socratic Irony

    14. Gregory Vlastos, ‘Socratic Irony’, Classical Quarterly 37, 1987, 79-96.
    15. Paula Gottlieb, ‘The Complexity of Socratic Irony: A Note on Professor Vlastos’ Account’,
    16. Classical Quarterly 42, 1992, 278-279

    17. Jill Gordon, ‘Against Vlastos on Complex Irony’, Classical Quarterly 46, 1996, 131-137.
    18. Alexander Nehamas, ‘Socratic Irony: Character and Interlocutors’, in The Art of Living (Berkeley
    19. and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 46-69.

    20. Iakovos Vasiliou, ‘Conditional Irony in the Socratic Dialogues’, Classical Quarterly 49, 1999,
    21. 456-472.

    22. Melissa Lane, ‘The Evolution of Eironeia in Classical Greek Texts: Why Socratic Eironeia is Not Irony’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31, 2006, 49-83.
    23. G. R. F. Ferrari, ‘Socratic Irony as Pretence’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34, 2008, 1-33.
    24. Volume II: Issues Arising from the Trial of Socrates

      Introduction to volume II

      Part 3. The Trial of Socrates

    25. Josiah Ober, ‘Gadfly on Trial: Socrates as Citizen and Social Critic’, in C. Blackwell (ed.), Demos:
    26. Classical Athenian Democracy, a publication of The Stoa: A Consortium

      for Electronic Publication in the Humanities [www.stoa.org], 2003.

    27. Paul Cartledge, ‘The Trial of Socrates, 399 BCE’, in Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice
    28. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp. 76-90 .

    29. Myles Burnyeat, ‘The Impiety of Socrates’, Ancient Philosophy 17, 1997, 1-12.
    30. Anna Lӓnnstrӧm, ‘Socrates’ Moral Impiety and its Role at the Trial: A Reading of Euthyphro 6a’,
    31. Polis 30, 2013, 30-48.

      4. Socrates and Greek Religion

    32. Scott Calef, ‘Piety and the Unity of Virtue in Euthyphro 11e-14c’, Oxford Studies in Ancient
    33. Philosophy 13, 1995, 1-26.

    34. Mark McPherran, ‘Piety, Justice and the Unity of Virtue’, Journal of the History of Philosophy
    35. 38, 2000, 299-328.

    36. Øyvind Rabbås, ‘Piety as a Virtue in the Euthyphro’, Ancient Philosophy 25, 2005, 291-318.
    37. Mark McPherran, ‘Socrates on Teleological and Moral Theology’, Ancient Philosophy 14, 1994,
    38. 245-262.

      Part 5. Socrates and the Athenian State

    39. Mark Anderson, ‘Socrates as Hoplite’, Ancient Philosophy 25, 2005, 273-289.
    40. Paul Woodruff, ‘Socrates on Political Courage’, Ancient Philosophy 27, 2007, 289-302.
    41. The Crito

    42. Verity Harte, ‘Conflicting Values in Plato’s Crito’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 81, 1999,
    43. 117-147.

    44. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, ‘Persuade or Obey’, Harvard Review of Philosophy 19, 2013, 69-83.
    45. Micah Lott, ‘Because I Said So: Practical Authority in Plato’s Crito’, Polis: The Journal of Ancient
    46. Political Thought 32, 2015, 3-31.

      Part 6. Socrates and the Sophists

    47. Stephen Everson, ‘The Incoherence of Thrasymachus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 16,
    48. 1998, 99-131.

    49. Devin Stauffer, ‘Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato’s Gorgias’, The Review of Politics 64, 2002, 627-657.
    50. Franco Trivigno, ‘The Moral and Literary Character of Hippias in Plato’s Hippias Major’, Oxford
    51. Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50, 2016, 31-65.

      Volume III: Method and Epistemology

      Introduction to volume III

      Part 7. Introduction

    52. Robert Nozick, ‘Socratic Puzzles’, Phronesis 40, 2, 1995, 143-155.
    53. Angela M. Smith, ‘Knowledge and Expertise in the Early Platonic Dialogues’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80, 1998, 129-161)
    54. Paul Woodruff, ‘Socrates and the Irrational’, in Nicholas D. Smith and Paul B. Woodruff (eds),
    55. Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 130-150.

      Part 8. Elenchus

    56. Don Adams, ‘Elenchos and Evidence’, Ancient Philosophy 18, 1998, 287-308.
    57. Hugh Benson, ‘Problems with Socratic Method’, in Gary Alan Scott (ed.), Does Socrates Have a
    58. Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond (University Park,

      Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 101-113.

    59. Alejandro Santana, ‘Constructivism and the Problem of the Socratic Elenchos’, Ancient Philosophy 27, 2007, 251-267.
    60. Part 9. Definition

    61. David Wolfsdorf, ‘Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions’, Phronesis 48, 2003, 271-312.
    62. Michael N. Forster, ‘Socrates’ Demand for Definitions’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31,

      2006, 1-47.

       

      Part 10. Induction

    63. Mark McPherran, ‘Socratic Epagōgē and Socratic Induction’, Journal of the History of Philosophy
    64. 45, 2007, 347-364.

       

      Part 11. Epistemology

    65. Iakovos Vasiliou, ‘Socratic Principles, Socratic Knowledge’, Philosophical Inquiry: Philosophical
    66. Quarterly 21, 1999, 93-113.

    67. Michael N. Forster, ‘Socrates’ Profession of Ignorance’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32,
    68. 2007, 1-35.

    69. Gail Fine, ‘Does Socrates Claim to Know that he Knows Nothing?’, Oxford Studies in Ancient
    70. Philosophy 35, 2008, 49-88.

    71. Scott J. Senn, ‘Ignorance or Irony in Plato’s Socrates?: A Look Beyond Avowals and Disavowals
    72. of Knowledge’, The Plato Journal 13, 2013, 77-108.

      12. Deliberation

    73. Eugenio Benitez, ‘Deliberation and Moral Expertise in Plato’s Crito’, Apeiron 29, 1996, 21-47.
    74. Hugh Benson, ‘What Should Euthyphro Do?’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 30, 2013, 115-
    75. 146.

      Volume IV: Socratic Moral Psychology

      Introduction to Volume IV

      Part 13. Reason and Emotion

    76. Terence Irwin, ‘The Protagoras’, in Plato’s Ethics’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 78-94.
    77. Terence Irwin, ‘Implications of the Gorgias’, in Plato’s Ethics’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 116-126.
    78. Daniel Devereux, ‘Socrates’ Kantian Conception of Virtue’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 33, 1995, 381-408.
    79. Terry Penner, ‘Socrates on the Strength of Knowledge: Protagoras 351B-357E’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79, 1997, 117-149.
    80. Raphael Woolf, ‘Callicles and Socrates: Psychic (Dis)harmony in the Gorgias’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18, 2000, 1-40.
    81. Heda Segvic, ‘No One Errs Willingly: The Meaning of Socratic Intellectualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19, 2000, 1-45.
    82. Gabriela Roxana Carone, ‘Calculating Machines or Leaky Jars? The Moral Psychology of Plato’s Gorgias’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26, 2004, 55-96.
    83. Rachel Singpurwalla, ‘Reasoning with the Irrational: Moral Psychology in the Protagoras’, Ancient Philosophy 26, 2006, 243-258.
    84. Jessica Moss, ‘The Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias’, Ancient Philosophy 17, 2007, 229-249.
    85. Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, ‘Socrates on the Emotions’, The Plato Journal 15, 2015, 9-28.
    86. Thomas Blackson, ‘Two Interpretations of Socratic Intellectualism’, Ancient Philosophy 35, 2015, 23-39.
    87. Part 14. Happiness

    88. Gerasimos Santas, ‘Socratic Goods and Socratic Happiness’, Apeiron 26, 1993, 26-52.
    89. Russell E. Jones, ‘Felix Socrates?’, Philosophia (Athens) 43, 2013, 77-98.
    90. Nicholas D. Smith, ‘Socrates on the Human Condition’, Ancient Philosophy 36, 1, 2016, 81-95.

     

     

     

    Biography

    Willaim Prior is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara University, California, USA