This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).
Preface William G. Hyland Introduction Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter Part 1. Conceptualising Soviet National Security Decision-Making 1. Modelling Soviet Defence Decision-Making Arthur J. Alexander 2. The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet National Security Decision-Making Vernon V. Aspaturian 3. The Politics of Defence in the Soviet Union: Brezhnev’s Era Dimitri K. Simes Part 2. The Military and Soviet National Security Decision-Making 4. The Historical Legacy in Soviet Weapons Development Jerry F. Hough 5. Defence R&D Policy-Making in the USSR Ellen Jones 6. The Soviet Military and SALT Raymond L. Garthoff Part 3. Soviet Foreign Policy Decision-Making 7. Soviet Decision-Making on Czechoslovakia, 1968 Jiri Valenta 8. Soviet Decision-Making in the Yom Kippur War, 1973 Galia Golan 9. Soviet Decision-Making on Afghanistan, 1979 Jiri Valenta 10. Risk Aversion in Soviet Decision-Making Dennis Ross Part 4. Summary and Outlook 11. Soviet National Security Decision-Making: What Do We Know and What Do We Understand? Stephen M. Meyer 12. The Study of Soviet Decision-Making for National Security: What Is To Be Done? William C. Potter