The Sovnarkhoz Reform of 1957 was designed by Khrushchev to improve efficiency in the Soviet economic system by decentralising economic decision making from all-Union branch ministries in Moscow to the governments of the individual republics and regional economic councils. Based on extensive original research, including unpublished archival material, this book examines the reform, discussing the motivations for it, which included Khrushchev's attempt to strengthen his own power base. The book explores how the process of reform was implemented, especially its impact on the republics, and analyses why the reform, which was reversed in 1959, failed. Overall, the book reveals a great deal about the workings, and the shortcomings, of the Soviet economic system at its height.
Foreword Geoffrey Swain Preface Introduction Part 1: In a Search for a More Efficient Economic Administration1. 1953-1956: Exploring the Horizons for Administrative Reorganization 2. XX Congress – December 1956 CC CPSU Plenum: The Height of Expectations 3. The Sovnarkhoz Reform Part 2: Decentralization of Decision-making: Hopes and Disillusionment4. Setting New Elements 5. First Disillusionment: Plan for 1958 6. Republican Budgetary Rights 7. Decentralizing the Supply System: Losing Control over Resources 8. Gosplan of Ukraine: Setting its Authority in the Republic Part 3: Recentralizing Economic Administration 9. The Turning Point 10. November 1962 CC CPSU Plenum: Giving up on the Reform? 11. Recentralization in Ukraine 12. Epilogue 13. Conclusion
This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, high-quality, research-level work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social science subjects.