1st Edition
Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
Part 1. Theory 1. Risk and Risk-Taking 2. A Chess Game Named Disaster 3. Pandora’s Marble Pot 4. Crisis and Risk in International Relations 5. Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: Wisdoms and Conventional Wisdoms Part 2. Case Studies 2.1. The Berlin Crisis of 1948 6. Interpretations, Ambiguities and Questions 7. Evolution of the Crisis: Events, Perceptions, Risks and Stages of Development 8. Factors of Risk-Taking 9. 1948: Process Analysis 10. 1948: Consequences, Conclusions and Lessons 2.2. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 11. Interpretations, Ambiguities and Questions 12. Evolution of the Crisis: Events, Perceptions, Risks and Stages of Development 13. Factors of Risk-Taking 14. Process Analysis 15. Consequences, Conclusions and Lessons Part 3. Comparisons and Conclusions 16. Operational Principles of Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior 17. Factors of Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior
Biography
Hannes Adomeit
Reviews from the 1982 publication:
‘Probably the best and most authoritative and certainly the most meticulously researched account of the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961.’ The Economist
‘This book of Hannes Adomeit’s is a special event for students of Soviet foreign policy. It is indispensable reading for anyone interested in a rigorous analysis of Soviet crisis behavior.’ Seweryn Bialer, Columbia University
‘Adomeit’s book is a fine synthesis of history, political analysis, and theories of decision making in as neatly reasoned and well-written a volume as one could wish for.’ Thane Gustafson, Georgetown University
