This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.
Table of Contents
1. Soviet Strategy: An Introduction Gerald Segal and John Baylis Part 1. The Evolution of Soviet Strategy 2. Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win? Robert L. Arnett 3. The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy Ken Booth Part 2. Contemporary Issues 4. How To Think About Soviet Military Doctrine Benjamin S. Lambeth 5. Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications Dennis Ross 6. The Soviet Military and SALT Raymond L. Garthoff Part 3. The Use of the Military Instrument 7. Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behaviour Hannes Adomeit 8. The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower Michael MccGwire
John Baylis and Gerald Segal