This new book analyzes how the Soviet leadership evaluated developments in Soviet-Vietnamese relations in the years from 1949 to 1964.
Focusing on how Soviet leaders actually perceived China’s role in Vietnam relative to the Soviet role, it shows how these perceptions influenced the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. It also explains how and when Moscow’s enthusiasm for the active Chinese role in Vietnam came to an end – or, in other words, from what point was Beijing’s involvement in Vietnam perceived as a liability rather than an asset, in the strategies of Soviet policy makers.
This book is an excellent resource for all students with an interest in Soviet-Vietnamese relations and of strategic studies and international relations in general.
1. Choosing Sides. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the World, 1945-1949 2. Setting the Stage: The Soviet Union, China and the First Indochina War, 1949-1953 Chapter 3. The End of the War and the Geneva Conference, 1953-1954 4. Together for Communism? Sino-Soviet Cooperation and the Rebuilding of North Vietnam, 1954-1957 5. Reunification by Revolution? The Soviet and Chinese Role in Vietnamese Reunification Plans, 1957-1961 6. The Fight over Laos, 1961-1962 7. From Disinterest to Active Support, 1962-1965 Appendices