1st Edition

Special Operations and Strategy From World War II to the War on Terrorism

By James D. Kiras Copyright 2006
248 Pages
by Routledge

252 Pages 7 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

256 Pages 7 B/W Illustrations
by Routledge

James D. Kiras shows how a number of different special operations, in conjunction with more conventional military actions, achieve and sustain strategic effect(s) over time. In particular, he argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship existing between moral and material attrition at the strategic level. He also presents a theoretical... Read more

1. Special Operations and Great Raids  2. "Seeing ‘Black Lights’ Before Sinking Into Oblivion": Theories of Strategic Paralysis  3. "A Dark Picture of Destruction": Special Operations, the Persistence of Ideas, and Dambusting Dambusting: Raid or Special Operation?  4. Death By A Thousand Cuts: Special Operations, Attrition, and the Nature of Warfare  5. Case Study: "Looting a Burning House," The SAS in the Campaign of Attrition in Normandy, 1944  6. Conclusion: Special Operations and the Nature of Strategy

Biography

James Kiras is Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and has over 10 years of experience in the realms of academia, defense policy, and national security. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in History from the University of Massachusetts at Boston and a Master’s degree in History/International Relations from the University of Toronto. Dr. Kiras successfully defended his PhD dissertation at the University of Reading in 2004. He is a recognized author on the subject of special operations, terrorism, and irregular warfare with numerous book chapters and articles to his credit.

'With Special Operations and Strategy, James D Kiras offers a rare scholarly analysis of the ways in which SO can – and cannot – contribute to strategic success. In so doing, Kiras warns policymakers against making costly and tragically common errors under the influence of theoretical concepts which, whatever their value in other types of operations, are inappropriate for this type of warfare.'
Dr Thomas M. Kane, University of Hull, UK

'...this monograph has great value to policy makers and soldiers, conventional and unconventional.'
Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Thomas P. Odom, Small Wars Journal