By virtue of several theoretical models and hypotheses, this book is one of the earliest studies which systematically investigates the structure and changes of China’s financial institutions.
To begin with, it examines the relation between state utility function and China’s economic growth, and reveals the formation and transition of China’s state-owned financial institutional arrangements. Based on this analysis, the author studies the influence of monetization on the arrangements, and the financial support to China’s gradual reform which have long been neglected by researchers. Also, the model of money demand that can explain the specific conditions of the gradual reform is built, as the neoclassical framework has been incapable of explaining China’s financial performance. In the last chapter, it discusses the dilemma of property rights under the state-owned financial system, with the establishment of the credit equilibrium model and the dual model of bad debts.
With insightful theoretical analysis and empirical researches, this book will appeal to scholars and students in finance, economics and economic history.
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Chapter 1 The Institutional Structure, State and State-Owned Financial Institutional Arrangements
Chapter 2 Monetization and Financial Control by the State
Chapter 3 Financial Support to the Gradual Reform
Chapter 4 The Model of Money Demand During Transition
Chapter 5 Transitional Arrangements of the Financial System
Chapter 6 Dilemma of Property Rights under the State-Owned Financial System and the Path of Solution
Appendix Benefit and Cost of Financial Control by the State: Item Data
Jie Zhang is a Professor and the Head of the International Monetary Institute, Renmin University of China. His main research interests lie in the financial institution and financial development in China.