1st Edition
Supermajority Voting in Constitutional Courts The Problem of Majority Rule for Democracy and Legislation
1. Introduction; 2. Methodology; 3: A Brief History of Voting Rules in the West; 4: The Traits of Voting Rules; 5: Against Majority Rule in Constitutional Review; 6: For Supermajority Rules in Constitutional Review; 7: Practical Issues; Conclusion: A Call for Gradual Experimentation; Appendix: Court in Which the Core Cases Apply—A Preliminary View
Biography
Cristóbal Caviedes is Assistant Professor of Law, Universidad Católica del Norte, Chile.
‘A must-read for anyone interested in the institutional design of courts! Cristóbal Caviedes has produced a superb, deep and surprising piece of scholarship that invites the readers to rethink conventional wisdom by providing strong reasons for replacing majority rule with supermajority rules in constitutional review.’
Yaniv Roznai, Reichman University, Israel
‘In this insightful book, Cristóbal Caviedes fills a major gap in scholarship on institutional design and constitutional review. Identifying the importance and neglect of judicial decision procedures, he presents a rigorously argued case for supermajority voting rules on constitutional courts. A tour de force.’
Stephen Gardbaum, UCLA School of Law
'An indispensable book for anyone concerned with the politization of courts and the legitimacy of their decisions.'
Francisco J Urbina, University of Notre Dame
