1st Edition

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited Anatomy of a Controversy

Edited By Robert Jervis, James J. Wirtz Copyright 2022
184 Pages
by Routledge

184 Pages
by Routledge

184 Pages
by Routledge

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to... Read more

Preface

Robert Jervis

Introduction: How could getting it right go so wrong? The 2007 Iran NIE revisited

James J. Wirtz

PART I

1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities – Key judgments

2. CIA support to policymakers: the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities

Gregory F. Treverton

3. Reevaluating the ‘externals’ and ‘internals’ of the 2007 Iran nuclear NIE

Vann H. Van Diepen

PART II

4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy

John E. McLaughlin

5. 2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story

Thomas Fingar

6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

Richard H. Immerman

7. The November 2007 Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath

Robert Jervis

PART III

8. Reflections on conveying uncertainty

Gregory F. Treverton

9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications

Aaron Arnold, Matthew Bunn, Caitlin Chase, Steven E. Miller, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen and William H. Tobey

PART IV

10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the Iran nuclear threat

Sarah E. Kreps

11. U.S.–Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an analysis of alternative policy options

Masoud Kazemzadeh

12. Weapons of mass destruction: the issue of ‘actionable’ intelligence

James J. Wirtz

Epilogue: The rise of counter-proliferation intelligence

James J. Wirtz and Robert Jervis

Biography

Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, USA. He is the author of many books, including Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (2010). He received his Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley, USA.

James J. Wirtz is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA. He recently completed co-editing the 7th edition of Strategy in the Contemporary World (2022). He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, USA.