1st Edition

The Case for Congress Separation of Powers and the War on Terror

By Victor M. Hansen, Lawrence Friedman Copyright 2009
    144 Pages
    by Routledge

    144 Pages
    by Routledge

    The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror examines the constitutional relationship between Congress and the President in the post-September 11 world, arguing that Congress should exercise its legitimate authority in guiding United States policy. While many commentators have focused on the extent of the President's national security and foreign affairs authority, both domestically and abroad, this title focuses on the constitutional authority of Congress to serve as a check on executive power. As a national consensus has developed around the notion that the Bush administration made grave errors in its policy decisions, a reminder of the leading role that Congress can play in those decisions is particularly appropriate. Unlike scholarly work devoted either to detailing or criticizing the Bush administration's policy decisions, this accessible and balanced book focuses on the policies themselves, and on the way in which Congress can influence those policies for the better. The authors further offer specific and useful recommendations for legislative measures that may correct existing policy deficiencies and promote sounder decision-making in the area of national security and foreign affairs.

    Contents: Preface; Introduction: Congress and the President after September 11; The constitutional framework; Emergency powers; The aftermath of Abu Ghraib and the need for Congressional action; The case against secret evidence; Extraordinary renditions and the state secrets privilege; Civilian control of the military and attempts to politicize military lawyers; The case for Congress; Index.

    Biography

    Victor M. Hansen is Associate Professor of Law at New England Law | Boston where he teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Professional Responsibility. Before joining the New England faculty in 2005, he was a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army JAG Corps. He previously served as a regional defense counsel for the United States Army Trial Defense Service, and worked as a military prosecutor and supervising prosecutor in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Riley (Kansas). He also served as an associate professor of law at The Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia. He is the author or contributing author of numerous manuals and articles on criminal and military law, evidence, and trial advocacy. Lawrence Friedman is Professor of Law at New England Law | Boston, USA, where he teaches Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, and State Constitutional Law. Before teaching, his work as an attorney focused on environmental, land use, Internet, and government enforcement litigation. He is a member of the Boston Bar Council and a member of the board of directors of the Massachusetts Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, and has published numerous articles on constitutional law, the Massachusetts constitution, privacy law, and other topics.

    'Professors Hansen and Friedman have undertaken a project of enormous importance; their "call to Congress" to act in the face of an expansive interpretation of executive power is extraordinarily timely. By carefully analyzing the direct costs that arise from unfettered executive power, the authors make a compelling argument for greater Congressional involvement and oversight. History shows the inherent strength of their argument; time will tell whether their words of wisdom are adhered to. We would all benefit were Congress to listen to the cogency of Hansen's and Friedman's thesis. Amos Guiora, University of Utah, USA 'Professors Hansen and Friedman have produced a valued addition to the contemporary dialogue on the law related to the planning, execution, and oversight of national security policy. In an area that has never been more important for preserving the delicate balance between security and the values that define our nation, this work stands apart from the veritable avalanche of legal commentary and analysis devoted to this topic. What distinguishes this work is the perspective these two scholars bring to their task. Hansen and Friedman deftly weave together expertise that transcends the traditional separation of powers approach to these important issues. That foundation is certainly apparent, but by adding expertise in military law and ethics, national security criminal procedures, and a broad based understanding of national security policy, the authors offer an unique insight into this important subject. Engaging, insightful, and comprehensive, their work will undoubtedly make a tremendous contribution to the study of this important subject.' Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, USA