Foreword by Professor Paschalis M. Kitromilides
Acknowledgements
Introduction: ‘An evolutionary path, with self-government as a first step’
PART ONE – SETTING THE STAGE
Chapter 1 – Greek-Turkish relations
1.1 Turkish revisionism
1.2 Greek communities of Turkey
1.3 Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople
Chapter 2 – Smoke signals
2.1 The British factor
2.2 General Consulate of Nicosia
2.3 Return of the Ethnarch
Chapter 3 – Foundering
3.1 A new Governor
3.2 The ascendant Turkish factor
PART TWO – FROM INDEPENDENCE TO PARTITION
Chapter 4 – The ‘ill-fated’ thirteen points
4.1 ‘Salvaging the shipwreck’
4.2 Collapse of the Zurich constitutional order
4.3 Turkish Cypriot enclaves
Chapter 5 – The dissenting pragmatists
5.1 Diplomatic tensions
5.2 Quest for settlement
5.3 The Turkish invasion
PART THREE – FACETS OF GREECE’S CYPRUS POLICY
Chapter 6 – A bifurcated strategy
6.1 The dual-track policy
6.2 Cold War ideologies
6.3 Relapse
Chapter 7 – Deligiannism and judicious adaptations
7.1 The case of Seferiades
7.2 Battlefront mentality
7.3 Institutional counterpoints
Conclusion: Diplomacy as dissent
Appendices
I. ‘The Cyprus issue and Turkey’ (1958) [V. Mostras]
II. ‘Enlightening the British about the Cyprus issue’ (1956) [V. Mostras]
III. ‘National defiance’ (1976) [A.S. Vlachos]
Bibliography
Index
Biography
George Kalpadakis is a Senior Researcher at the Academy of Athens, Greece. He has been a Lewis–Gibson Visiting Fellow at the University of Cambridge, a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge, as well as Visiting Professor at the University of Vienna. His publications include The Macedonian dispute, 1962–1995 (3rd ed. 2012; Academy of Athens Award 2013) and Une confédération des Balkans (2026). He studied at University College London, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the University of Athens, where he was awarded his PhD with Distinction in 2009.
‘Kalpadakis deploys detailed and subtle arguments to re-examine the diplomatic exchanges and political manoeuvres that took place during the twenty-year period leading up to the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, with particular attention to the shifting role of the Government of Greece. I have no doubt that it will become a standard work on the diplomatic background to this turbulent period of the island’s history’ - David Holton, Professor Emeritus, University of Cambridge, UK.
‘We are in the author’s debt for offering such a reflective and instructive work to all those concerned with the serious study of the Cyprus Question. Kalpadakis’ study emerges not only as a diplomatic history of Cyprus but as a reflection on the conditions under which political communities reconcile aspiration with limitation, and passion with judgment. It stands, gently but unmistakably, as a work of policy-relevant history’ - Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Academy of Athens and Professor Emeritus, University of Athens, Greece.
‘Tools exist for turning tragedy into wisdom: one of those is this masterful synthesis on the Cyprus question. Having mined unpublished or neglected archives to brilliant effect, it excels in the clarity with which it frames policy debates using the exchanges of Greek diplomats and politicians’ - Brady Kiesling, Former U.S. diplomat and author of Diplomacy Lessons.
‘This important study draws on a rich archival base and marshals it into an original, cogent account. Kalpadakis details how pragmatic voices were sidelined at critical junctures — sacrificed, time and again, on the altar of what George Theotokas memorably termed Greece's "perennial Deligiannism" — a pattern that played directly into Ankara's revisionist ambitions, culminating in the tragic invasion in 1974’ - Nicos Mouzelis, Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK.
